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FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN WAR TIME:
WORLD WAR I AND THE CIVIL LIBERTIES PATH NOT TAKEN
Laura M. Weinrib
Forthcoming, Emory Law Journal, Volume 65, Issue 4

This Article examines the relationship between expressive freedom and freedom of
conscience in the formative years of the modern First Amendment. It focuses on efforts by
the American Union Against Militarism and National Civil Liberties Bureau—the
organizational precursors to the ACLU—to secure exemptions from military service for
conscientious objectors whose opposition to American involvement in the First World
War stemmed from socialist or radical labor convictions rather than religious scruples.
Although such men asserted secular, ethical objections to war, advocates strained to
expand the First Amendment’s free exercise clause to encompass them. Concurrently,
they sought to import a generalized theory of freedom of conscience into constitutional
constructions of freedom of speech and press, within and outside the courts. The
conception of liberty of conscience that they advanced, which they linked to an “AngloSaxon tradition” of individual rights, clashed with Progressive understandings of
democratic citizenship and failed to gain broad-based traction.
Civil liberties advocates consequently reframed their defense of political
objectors in terms that emphasized democratic dissent rather than individual autonomy.
Sympathetic academics and a few judges embraced this Progressive theory of free
speech, which celebrated discursive openness as a prerequisite for democratic legitimacy
and justified, rather than cabined, the exercise of state power. Even in the interwar
period, however, the proponents of this vision remained deeply ambivalent about the
courts and generally hostile to individual rights. Although some accepted a limited role
for judicial enforcement of the First Amendment’s speech clause, most declined to
endorse a court-centered and constitutional right to exemption from generally applicable
laws.

In his seminal account of the First Amendment and the First World War, Freedom
of Speech in War Time, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., described an “unprecedented extension of
the business of war over the whole nation.”1 On Chafee’s telling, the sweeping scope of
the wartime propaganda campaign had transformed the United States into a “theater of
war.”2 Public officials and mainstream Americans lost sight of the tradeoff between order
1
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Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937 (1919).
Id.

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711451

and freedom and denounced all criticism of the country’s cause as a threat to public
safety. Hundreds of prosecutions ensued, and the cessation of hostilities in Europe failed
to stem the demand for censorship at home.3 The new speech-restrictive climate, in
Chafee’s assessment, made it “increasingly important to determine the true limits of
freedom of expression,” as a matter of national policy as well as the First Amendment.4
Almost a century after Chafee published his influential tract, scholars continue to
trace the emergence of the “modern First Amendment” to the enforced conformity of the
war.5 When the wartime hysteria receded, they explain, prominent officials and
intellectuals recognized the high toll of repression and awoke to the value of countermajoritarian constitutionalism in the domain of free speech.6 Although it would take
another decade for a Supreme Court majority to overturn a conviction on First
Amendment grounds, the path forward was clear: henceforth, the courts would prevent
overzealous legislators and administrators from abridging expressive freedom.
Of course, the modern First Amendment contains other provisions than the one
that prohibits Congress from abridging freedom of speech, and it reflects other values
than open democratic debate. During the First World War, self-described civil
libertarians endorsed these wider commitments. The very same advocates who litigated
speech claims under the Espionage Act also invoked the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment to defend an asserted right of conscientious objectors to refuse military
service. And yet, though the scholarship on wartime civil liberties advocacy has
Id. at 932–33.
Id. at 933–34.
For example, GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1038–39 (7th ed.
2013), describes “speech that ‘causes’ unlawful conduct” as the “first issue of first
amendment interpretation to capture the Court’s sustained interest,” and traces the
Court’s engagement with the issue to “a series of cases concerning agitation against the
war and the draft during World War I.” See also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–1920 1 (1997) (noting that the majority of scholars locate “the
creation of the modern First Amendment” during the period beginning with the passage
of the Espionage Act of 1917). On Chafee’s influence, see MARK A. GRABER,
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 2
(1991) (describing Chafee as “the early twentieth-century jurist most responsible for
developing the modern interpretation of the First Amendment”); id. at 122 (summarizing
literature).
6 E.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
FROM WILSON TO FDR 8–9 (1972) (emphasizing the “World War I crisis in civil
liberties” and the ensuing Red Scare as the catalysts of interwar contestation over
free speech); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 230 (2004) (“The government’s
extensive repression of dissent during World War I and its conduct in the immediate
aftermath of the war had a significant impact on American society. It was at this moment,
in reaction to the country’s excesses, that the modern civil liberties movement truly
began.”).
3
4
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thoroughly canvassed contestation over dissenting speech,7 it rarely dwells on the
consequences of patriotic repression for freedom of conscience,8 either as a species of
religious freedom or as a secular concept justifying civil disobedience or counseling
legislative restraint.9 Nor does the expansive literature on demands for exemptions from
E.g., CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN (2008); GRABER, supra note 5; THOMAS
HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND AND
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013); PAUL MURPHY, WORLD
WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); STONE, supra
note 6; JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF
AMERICAN LAW (2007).
8
An important exception is Jeremy Kessler’s recent article, The Administrative Origins
of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (2014). Kessler demonstrates
that key War Department officials, including Felix Frankfurter and Newton Baker, were
sympathetic to conscientious objectors and sought to accommodate their claims despite
contrary legislative language and substantial resistance from military personnel. Id. at
1088. Their efforts to implement administrative accommodations were a crucial
antecedent of one strand of interwar civil libertarianism. Id. at 1090. As Kessler
acknowledges, however, many government officials opposed their lenient attitude toward
objectors. Id. This Article highlights the dominant sentiment among Progressives—
including many of Frankfurter and Baker’s own allies—that exemption from military
service threatened social interests. It also emphasizes that the War Department considered
conscientious objection to the taking of human life to raise special concerns, not
implicated by moral and political objection to other government policies. Finally, it
argues that the accommodationist approach flowed from a Progressive Era preference for
democratic deliberation and administrative tolerance far removed from the court-centered
alternative identified with civil liberties today. See also RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING
FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987) (discussing
Harry Weinberger’s work on behalf of the No-Conscription League); CAPOZOLLA, supra
note 7, at 55–82, 81 (concluding, after discussion, that “the objectors were some of
twentieth-century America’s first modern citizens” and that “[w]hat made them
distinctive was their assertion of individual rights against the modern state.”). There
is, of course, a substantial literature on conscientious objectors during the First World
War that explores issues other than legal categories and rights claims. See, e.g., U.S.
Selective Service System, Conscientious Objection (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950);
GEORGE Q. FLYNN, CONSCRIPTION AND DEMOCRACY: THE DRAFT IN FRANCE, GREAT
BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES (2002); GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940–1973
(1993); H. C. PETERSON AND GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917–1918 (1957);
LILLIAN SCHLISSEL, CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN AMERICA, 1757–1967 (1968); LOUISA THOMAS,
CONSCIENCE (2011); R. R. Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition
in the United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1952).
9 For example, Samuel Walker attributes “[t]he idea of personally confronting
government power through nonviolent direct action” to the efforts of conscientious
7
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generally applicable laws—an issue that has recently assumed increased significance10—
devote much attention to the failure of such claims during these formative years of the
modern First Amendment.11
The most intuitive explanations for the divergence in emphasis will not hold up to
scrutiny. One might assume, for example, that the literature has discounted wartime
claims for exemption because they were unsuccessful in the courts.12 On the whole,
however, claims for free speech were just as unavailing.13 Similarly, one might
emphasize that the Free Exercise clause was not formally incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus made applicable to the states, for over two decades
objectors during the Second, rather than First, World War. SAMUEL WALKER, IN
DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 151 (2nd ed., 1999). On the
distinction between secular and religious understandings of freedom of conscience,
see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
10 For discussion of the growth and transformation of exemption claims, see Mary Anne
Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of
Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 480–
82 (2015) (emphasizing shift from accommodation of beliefs and modes of worship to
“religiously motivated differences in how to live”); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124
YALE L. J. 2516 (2015) (discussing new prevalence of claims involving complicity in the
putatively sinful conduct of others).
11 In general, scholars have devoted relatively little consideration to legal arguments for
exemption during the years between Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the
1878 Supreme Court decision denying Mormons’ First Amendment claim to exemption
from a federal anti-bigamy statute, and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the
1940 case in which the Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus rendering it
binding on the states. For example, KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 28 (2006), discusses Reynolds v. United States and then
jumps to Cantwell v. Connecticut after noting, in a single sentence, that “[i]n a series
of cases in the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court rejected claims that
conscientious objectors had a free exercise right to avoid military service.” Given
the stakes of founding-era “historical understanding,” there is considerably more
scholarship on eighteenth century statutes, debates over constitutional provisions, and
early judicial opinions—though perhaps less than in other areas of constitutional law.
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) (“Even opponents of originalism
generally agree that the historical understanding is relevant, even if not dispositive.”; id.
at 1414 (noting dearth of historical scholarship on the early understandings of “free
exercise,” in contrast to the establishment clause, at the time of publication).
12 See, e.g., WILLIAM WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953 213, 220 (concluding that the Supreme Court “hand[ed]
down no significant religion-clause cases before 1940”).
13 STONE, supra note 6, at 170–82.
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after the Armistice.14 But the Selective Service Act (like the Espionage Act) was federal
legislation.15 And if incorporation matters because it enhanced or reflected the perceived
importance of religious liberty, it bears emphasis that the speech clause was not
incorporated until 1925 (and even then only in dicta)16—two years after the Court
counted the freedom “to worship God according to the dictates of [one’s] own
conscience” among the rights undoubtedly denoted by the term liberty in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17
It is tempting, but insufficient, to attribute the disproportionate focus on
expressive freedom to the supposed aberration of wartime speech and press restrictions,
which so troubled Zechariah Chafee.18 Certainly the scale of official investment in
homogenizing public opinion during World War I produced new challenges for
minorities and dissenters.19 At the same time, there was ample precedent for suppression
of free speech as well as freedom of conscience. Although both were consistently touted
as central features of American democracy throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, both faced significant limitations in practice.20 State constitutions often
included protective provisions, but enforcement was left to local discretion, and public
officials routinely policed perceived threats to state security, religious customs, or social
norms. In the domain of religious practice, exemptions were permitted and occasionally
required, but only for influential religious sects and only under state law.21 Lawyers
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76 (1917); Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217
(1917).
16 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The Supreme Court reversed a
conviction under a state criminal syndicalism law based on insufficiency of the
evidence in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 368 (1931), which set aside a conviction under California’s red flag law, the
Court reiterated its position that “the conception of liberty under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.” The press
clause was incorporated in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
18 Chafee, supra note 1, at 951-52 (arguing that “only once in our history prior to
1917 ha[d] an attempt been made to apply these doctrines” of bad tendency and
presumptive intent, and that “[t]he revival of those doctrines is a sure a sure
symptom of an attack upon the liberty of the press”).
19
See generally CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7; DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST
WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980).
20
See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (describing
weak speech-protective tradition during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries);
RABBAN, supra note 5, at 8 (describing the “restrictive prewar judicial tradition”).
21
McConnell, supra note 11, at 1492–1503. Philip Hamburger has argued that
McConnell overstates the extent to which founding era theorists and judges anticipated
the availability even of these limited exemptions. See generally Philip Hamburger, The
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); see
also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
14
15
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sometimes defended both radical expression and incursions on conscience by reference to
the United States Constitution, in terms that resembled, anachronistically, the
understanding of civil liberties that emerged after the war.22 Such efforts, however, rarely
succeeded in the courts.23 Indeed, the continuity of oppression was a theme of a 1918
conference on American Liberties in War Time.24 “Summarize the outrages showing that
this suppression of liberty is no new affair in American life,” a conference circular
advised.25
In retrospect, of course, the Espionage Act prosecutions, which singled out
speakers for their disfavored viewpoints, present core violations of the First
Amendment’s speech clause. By contrast, the political objectors who challenged the
draft demanded exemption from a generally applicable law on the basis of ethical
disagreement with its objectives—a peripheral free exercise claim at best. Still, that both
sets of claims were doctrinally implausible when they were raised and both anticipated
future advocacy and analysis suggests that something more than hindsight bias is at work.
In the end, the puzzle may stem primarily from the sources upon which the
modern First Amendment is presumed to rest: the agonized debates among Progressive
theorists and a few esteemed judges over the legitimacy of majoritarian oppression and
the role of the courts. The justification for constitutional insulation of expressive freedom
that emerged after World War I among liberal academics and judges imagined free
speech as a prerequisite for democratic legitimacy, essential to robust public debate and
to the informed formulation of government policy.26 It emphasized pluralism in place of
individual autonomy and endorsed free speech to buttress rather than undermine state
power.27 The proponents of this vision remained deeply ambivalent about the courts and
generally hostile to individual rights, though some accepted a limited role for judicial
enforcement of the First Amendment’s speech clause.28 I argue elsewhere that these
post-Progressive advocates of expressive freedom were only one component of an
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 120–26, 125 (2008) (reviewing McConnell and
Hamburger’s arguments and evidence and concluding that “accommodations were seen
as a good thing, and perhaps in many cases, by many people, as implicit in the notion of
religious liberty”).
22
See RABBAN, supra note 5, at 26–76.
23
See id. (describing free speech advocacy by the National Defense Association and Free
Speech League, among other groups).
24
Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, Circular (Dec. 29, 1917), in American Civil Liberties
Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years (1917–1950), Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library, Public Policy Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. [hereinafter ACLU
Papers], reel 1, vol. 3.
25
Id. at 4. It continued, “Refer to the negro, radical movements and labor in the past.” Id.
26 See generally GRABER, supra note 5.
27 I develop this argument in Laura Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights:
Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 187 (2009).
28 GRABER, supra note 5, at 66–86.
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interwar civil liberties coalition that also included conservative defenders of individual
liberty and labor radicals hostile to all manifestations of state power. It was the
Progressives, however, who most cogently articulated their views and who have therefore
dominated subsequent analysis. And those Progressives declined to endorse a
constitutional defense of exemption from generally applicable laws.
This Article interrogates the relationship between expressive and religious
freedom by shifting our lens to the advocates who resisted wartime repression on the
ground and, occasionally, in the courts. It demonstrates the extent to which the modern
understanding of free speech was bound up, at its inception, with claims by conscientious
objectors for exemption from military service. At the same time, it argues that these two
components of the First Amendment were understood in starkly different terms, even if
they served similar ends. It focuses on efforts by the American Union Against Militarism
(AUAM) and National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB)—the organizational precursors to
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)—to secure exemptions for so-called
“political objectors,” whose opposition to American military involvement in the First
World War stemmed from socialist or radical labor convictions rather than religious
scruples.
Given the formative role played by the interwar ACLU in fashioning the modern
understanding of civil liberties, the NCLB has figured prominently in histories of the
First Amendment, and rightly so. Generations of scholars have painstakingly documented
the NCLB’s early engagements with restrictive wartime laws and the officials that
enforced them.29 Most, however, have read the vision of the mature ACLU into the
operations of its wartime precursor. They have emphasized the NCLB’s appeal to neutral
constitutional principles, its steadfast defense of the rights of dissenters, independent of
their own policy preferences.30 In so doing, they have exaggerated the continuities
between the NCLB and its interwar heir. They have also inflated the influence of the
organization’s wartime work, even as they have understated or misconstrued the effect of
the war on the ACLU’s foundational commitments. The NCLB had few successes in the
courts. Between the spring of 1917 and the following winter, its leadership drew on a
broad range of prewar arguments in its effort to defend dissenters.31 The classical liberal
language of individual rights and the Progressive commitment to robust public discussion
29

On the origins of the ACLU, see ROBERT C. COTTRELL, ROGER NASH BALDWIN AND
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2000); DONALD JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO
AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION (1963); PEGGY LAMSON, ROGER BALDWIN, FOUNDER OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION: A PORTRAIT (1976); WALKER, supra note 9; WITT, supra note 7.
30
E.g., WALKER, supra note 9, at 19–20 (“The dispute that had produced the Civil
Liberties Bureau defined the basic terms of the free speech fight. The principled defense
of civil liberties was a two-sided struggle: It fought the suppression of free speech by
government officials and conservative superpatriots, but at the same time, it rejected
liberal pragmatism. The temptation to ignore violations of civil liberties in the name of
pursuing some other worthy social objective was a constant theme in ACLU history.”)
31
LAURA M. WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH, chapters 2–3 (forthcoming 2016).
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of social problems found a few sporadic supporters, but both proved inadequate to disrupt
the forces of wartime repression.
Still, amidst all the false starts and dead ends, there was one strand of argument
that proved especially unavailing. Even before American troops entered combat in
Europe, the organizers of the NCLB sought to shield conscientious objectors from
compulsory military service.32 They represented objectors of all type, but their particular
concern was those draftees whose opposition to military service stemmed from political
objections to a capitalist war. Although such men asserted secular, ethical objections to
war, the NCLB strained to expand the First Amendment’s free exercise clause to
encompass them. Concurrently, it sought to import a generalized theory of freedom of
conscience into constitutional concepts of freedom of speech and press. The NCLB
claimed that conscripting its clients would impede their liberty of conscience, and the
state was bound to exempt them from forced service to the state. During the First World
War, that was not a tenable position.
The stakes of under-examining exemption claims during the First World War
come more sharply into focus when one observes that scholars have not ignored wartime
advocacy on behalf of conscientious objectors altogether. On the contrary, histories of
civil liberties regularly mention the NCLB’s efforts to publicize and curtail the military’s
mistreatment of conscientious objectors. But they tend to collapse such endeavors into a
broader campaign against the authoritarian tendencies of the wartime state—a “modern
civil liberties movement” to match the modern First Amendment.33 On this view,
religious freedom may be a core component of the modern First Amendment, but World
War I figures in its lineage only as a precursor to subsequent expansion—the first step
along a continuous path curtailing state incursions on the rights of minorities and
dissenters.
In descriptions of the NCLB, there is a pervasive slippage between its advocacy
on behalf of conscientious objectors and its defense of expressive freedom.34 But while
both failed, the former was particularly maligned. Distaste for the NCLB’s theory among
even the founders’ own colleagues underscores the limits of pluralistic tolerance as a
basis for personal rights. The Progressive theorists who pressed sympathetic judges and
liberal scholars to expand the reach of the First Amendment in the immediate aftermath
of the war had encountered claims to conscience as well as expressive freedom. That
their defense of a counter-majoritarian First Amendment extended only to the latter was a
32

For elaboration of the NCLB’s attempts to shield conscientious objectors from service,
see Infra Part II.
33 E.g., ROBERT COTTRELL, ROGER NASH BALDWIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
49 (2000) (“As the United States officially entered the war, the AUAM … became
most concerned about protecting the rights of conscientious objectors and
safeguarding the civil liberties of those who opposed Wilson’s policies….In the
process the modern civil liberties movement was spawned. This was the first
sustained effort to safeguard the personal liberties guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights against encroachments by federal or state agents.”).
34
See, e.g., POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 79–80.
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deliberate choice, not a historical accident, and it warrants more careful attention than the
existing literature has afforded it.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the founding and early
operations of the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau of the AUAM and the Progressive
sympathies of its early leadership. Part II examines the deep divisions among
Progressives with respect to conscientious objection, which eventually precipitated the
creation of the NCLB as an independent entity. Part III explores the NCLB’s legal and
policy arguments and the treatment of its claims by judges and government officials. Part
IV canvases the attitudes toward liberty of conscience and religious exemptions among
liberals and conservatives during the interwar period and gestures toward the limits of the
Progressive theory of conscience espoused by the NCLB.
The conception of liberty of conscience that the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau
advanced, which it linked to an “Anglo-Saxon tradition” of individual rights, clashed
with Progressive understandings of democratic citizenship and failed to gain broad-based
traction.35 The organization consequently reframed its defense of political objectors
(along with its own title) in terms that emphasized democratic dissent rather than
individual autonomy. Over time, sympathetic academics and a few judges embraced this
Progressive theory of free speech, which celebrated discursive openness as a mechanism
of social change and justified, rather than cabined, the enlistment of state power on behalf
of social welfare.36
Despite its central role in promoting the Progressive vision of expressive freedom
to the public and in the courts, the early ACLU largely abandoned it. Chastened not only
by the wartime prosecution of labor radicals, but also by federal involvement in crushing
the great coal and steel strikes of 1919, the ACLU’s founders lost their confidence in
state power.37 During the 1920s and 1930s, they engineered the civil liberties consensus
reflected in the New Deal settlement, which melded Progressive enthusiasm for
democratic deliberation with conservatives’ state-skepticism and commitment to judicial
review.38 For decades, however, they failed to convince their Progressive allies to
countenance claims for exemption from generally applicable laws.39 The implications of
their choices are apparent in controversies over the First Amendment and democratic
legitimacy in the context of both expressive and religious freedom today.40
35

Infra note 163 and accompanying text.
See GRABER, supra note 5, at 2 (describing Zechariah Chafee’s reconceptualization of
free speech “as a functional requirement of democratic government, rather than as an
aspect of a more general right of individual liberty”); RABBAN, supra note 5, at 4
(arguing that “the postwar civil libertarians based their emerging concern about free
speech on its contribution to democracy rather than its status as a natural right of
autonomous individuals”).
37
Weinrib, supra note 31, at chapter 4.
38
Id., chapters 5–7; see also Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014
SUP. CT. REV. 297 (2015).
39
Infra Part IV.
40
Increasingly, proponents of accommodations have linked their project to the First
36

9

I. Liberty in the Progressive Era
In the fall of 1914, a group of social workers and settlement house directors
gathered informally in New York City to discuss strategies for keeping America out of
the war in Europe.41 Although they came to few definite conclusions, they sensed a need
for an organization uniting the various forces opposed to American military intervention
abroad. First known as the Henry Street Group, the new body tested a variety of names
before settling on the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM), a label that reflected
its twin goals of “guard[ing] against militarism” and “build[ing] toward world
federation.”42
The AUAM quickly grew into a large national organization with fifteen hundred
active members.43 Its principal constituency was social workers, but it also included
academics, clergy members, writers, and newspaper editors. Notable members included
Lillian Wald, director of New York’s Henry Street Settlement House; Paul Kellogg,
editor of the social work periodical the Survey; Jane Addams, founder of Hull House in
Chicago; Rabbi Stephen Wise; Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes; Oswald Garrison
Villard, publisher of the New York Evening Post and The Nation; and Crystal Eastman, a
leader of the Woman’s Peace Party and future co-founder of the NCLB.44 The
organization’s anti-war message, while by no means universally endorsed, was a
respectable one, and it attracted considerable support within and outside government.45
In its first years of operation, the AUAM orchestrated a national campaign against
preparedness—a movement that President Woodrow Wilson embraced in 1915 despite
his earlier commitment to avoid military engagement.46 Mass meetings throughout the
country drew huge crowds.47 Organizers lambasted preparedness but were careful not to
criticize the president.48 In fact, the AUAM exercised considerable influence with both
Amendment. For example, the “First Amendment Defense Act,” proposed in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), has the
stated purpose of “prevent[ing] discriminatory treatment of any person on the basis of
views held with respect to marriage” as a means of “remedying, deterring, and preventing
Government interference with religious exercise in a way that complements the
protections mandated by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
H.R. REP. NO. 2802 (2015).
41
C. ROLAND MARCHAND, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL REFORM,
1898-1918 223–25 (1973).
42
AM. UNION AGAINST MILITARISM, PAMPHLET, in American Union Against Militarism
Records (1915–1922), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Penn.
[hereinafter AUAM Papers], reel 10-1.
43
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 5.
44
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 5–6.
45
Id. at 5.
46
MARCHAND, supra note 41, at 239–45.
47
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 7.
48
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the Wilson administration and Congress, and Wilson received an AUAM delegation.49 In
May 1916, Germany pledged to provide adequate warning before attacking merchant and
passenger vessels.50 The following month, Wilson signed the National Defense Act.51
Although it provided for a significant expansion of the National Guard, the statute was
limited in scope, and the AUAM was gratified that it did not authorize conscription.52
Meanwhile, diplomatic developments appeared promising. By the summer of 1916, the
AUAM was satisfied with its successes and considered its work largely accomplished.53
All that changed in February 1917, when Germany resumed unrestricted
submarine warfare on vessels carrying supplies to Britain.54 Suddenly, the United States
was hurtling toward war, and many within the AUAM approved of the new trajectory.
Over the ensuing weeks, the organization scrambled to redefine its position. Some, like
Rabbi Stephen Wise and Oswald Garrison Villard, thought the change of circumstances
warranted reconsideration of the desirability of war.55 Others, though horrified at the new
German policy, were resolutely against a military solution.56
Norman Thomas, a Presbyterian minister and future leader of the Socialist Party,
proposed a possible strategy. Falling back on a time-worn Progressive tactic, he urged the
AUAM to organize a campaign for a “war referendum” in order to persuade government
officials that ordinary Americans continued to oppose intervention.57 As with the suffrage
and Prohibition movements, the “combination of agitation with direction” would arouse
the people to action.58 The AUAM adopted the suggestion, apparently unconcerned that
popular support might favor nationalist militancy. Later that month, the executive
committee discussed the agenda for an upcoming meeting with President Wilson.59 In
addition to soliciting the president’s support for a national referendum, the AUAM
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delegation would argue that conscription undermined the national interest.60 But the
organization’s efforts were fruitless, and the march toward war continued.
A few weeks later, an important new recruit joined the AUAM board. Roger Nash
Baldwin arrived in New York City in March 1917, as Crystal Eastman recovered from a
complicated pregnancy.61 Baldwin appeared to be a perfect replacement. Like Eastman,
he had substantial experience in Progressive reform movements. He had spent ten years
in St. Louis, where he was an active municipal reformer and a leader of myriad
Progressive organizations, including a settlement house, the National Probation Officers
Association, the Civic League, and the St. Louis Committee for Social Service Among
Colored People, the city’s first interracial organization.62 Through these activities, he
embedded himself in a network of nationally known social workers whose most
prominent representatives, including Jane Addams, Paul Kellogg, and Lillian Wald,
invited him to join the AUAM.63
In his early career, Baldwin had worked to improve rather than revolutionize
existing social and economic conditions. Increasingly, however, he began to flirt with
radical causes. He embarked on a decades-long correspondence with Emma Goldman and
warmed to her anarchist aspirations, namely, “a society with a minimum of compulsion, a
maximum of individual freedom and of voluntary association, and the abolition of
exploitation and poverty.”64 Inspired by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), he
helped to create municipal lodging and open a soup kitchen in St. Louis.65 He also began
reading The Masses, a socialist magazine whose editor, Max Eastman, was Crystal
Eastman’s brother.66
As much as his Progressive credentials, his new concern for industrial inequality
fitted Baldwin for the anti-militarism of the AUAM. The leaders of the AUAM attacked
the war effort as a conscious industrial campaign to undercut domestic reform and to
increase international trade.67 Like them, Baldwin believed that economic interests were
responsible for the war; without the profit motive, American industry would be far less
invested in preparedness.68
In March 1917, Baldwin accepted the AUAM’s invitation to take over Eastman’s
duties.69 When he arrived in New York, the organization lacked a clear sense of its
60
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wartime goals. Working with Norman Thomas,70 Baldwin focused on securing a statutory
exemption for conscientious objectors.71 The practice of excusing members of the historic
peace churches (such as the Quakers and Mennonites) from military service, generally
conditioned on paying a fine or procuring a substitute, was well established in the United
States.72 What Baldwin and Thomas advocated was, however, far bolder. As Thomas
explained in an August article in the Survey, “the phrase ‘religious liberty’ [had] come to
have meaning and value to mankind,” and religious objectors were therefore afforded a
measure of understanding.73 But in Thomas’s view, other rationales—including
“humanity, respect for personality, economic considerations of the capitalistic
exploitation at the root of all wars, … or ‘common sense’ observation of that failure of
war as an efficient means to progress”—deserved just as much consideration.74
AUAM representatives met with Newton D. Baker, Wilson’s secretary of war,
who expressed interest in the organization’s position.75 In its communications with
Baker and, subsequently, with members of Congress, the AUAM cast its defense of
conscientious objectors as a “matter not of corporate but of individual conscience.”76 The
organization consistently expressed concern for the rights of non-religious objectors,
including members of “the Socialist Party, and other political, industrial and pacifist
groups,” as well as unaffiliated individuals who espoused antiwar views.77 It argued that
objectors should be sorted according to their attitudes toward service—that is, whether a
given objector was willing to provide non-combatant service or no service at all—rather
than by motivation, be it religious, economic, or otherwise. For those who were willing to
accept it, the AUAM urged the government to offer alternative service. Even for the socalled “absolutists,” it pled tolerance, “especially if their own normal or voluntary
employment is socially valuable.”78
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At Baker’s urging, the Selective Service Act included an exemption from
combatant service for clergy and for members of well-recognized religious sects opposed
to participation in war.79 It authorized local draft boards to determine whether an
individual had established a qualifying religious affiliation and was therefore eligible for
non-combatant service.80 This was a significant, and unpopular, concession.81 To
Baldwin and Thomas, however, an exemption confined to well-recognized religious sects
was worse than no exemption at all.82 “If the interests of the state are so great that she
cannot permit conscience or conviction to hold sway in the matter of participation in war,
then she should conscript everyone,” they argued.83 By conflating conscience with
sectarian affiliation, the conscription bill misunderstood the term. “Conscience is
individual or it is nothing,” they insisted.84
A few years after the war, Roger Baldwin offered an overview of the nonsectarian objectors who refused to comply with conscription and who sought the
assistance of the AUAM.85 First, there were “a handful of religiously minded men
imbued with the ‘early Christian’ or Tolstoian faith,” most of whom also held radical
political and economic views.86 Unlike other political objectors, these men evinced an
“inherent reverence for human life” and opposed physical violence for any purpose,
including class war.87 The majority, however, “accepted the state as an institution,” and
(unlike the anarchists) acknowledged its power to “order them to do what they did not
regard as wrong.”88 The second and larger category of nonsectarian objector comprised
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the class-conscious socialists, who were willing to comply with the commands of a
working-class, but not a capitalist, state.89
The AUAM’s appeals on behalf of these “political objectors” failed to persuade
either Congress or the War Department. Baker would not budge, though he promised the
AUAM administrative moderation.90 Congress overwhelmingly rejected amendments
proposed by Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette and Colorado Representative Edward
Keating to broaden the class of objectors, despite Norman Thomas’s assurances that most
conscientious objectors were engaged in socially useful and often dangerous work on a
voluntary basis.91 While the conscription bills were in conference, Baldwin tried again,
citing British legislation that made the distinction he recommended.92 His efforts,
however, were unsuccessful. As war fervor intensified, claims to moderation faltered and
the AUAM’s popularity “hit bedrock.”93 On May 18, President Wilson signed the
Selective Service Act into law.94
Baldwin responded by organizing within the AUAM a Bureau for Conscientious
Objectors to assist inductees whose anti-war commitments prevented them from
registering for the draft.95 Its board attracted radical pacifists like Quaker activist L.
89
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Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, and Scott Nearing, a radical economist and
activist who would shortly join the Socialist Party and lead the People’s Council of
America for Democracy and Peace.96 Some of the most established AUAM members,
however, objected to the extension of the organization’s activity. Several thought it
better to establish an independent body, formally distinct from the AUAM.97 When a
majority of the directing committee voted to endorse Baldwin’s Bureau,98 Lillian Wald
and Paul Kellogg contemplated resignation from the organization they had founded.99
Responding to Wald and Kellogg’s concerns, Eastman mounted a spirited defense
of the new bureau.100 She argued that its program was “liberal” (the term that was
rapidly replacing Progressive as the favored label for reformers101), not “extreme
radical.”102 She believed the president had signaled a similarly liberal attitude toward
96
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enforcement of the Selective Service Act in his appointments to the War Department,
which included Frederick Keppel, dean of Columbia University, and Progressive
ideologue Walter Lippmann.103
Eastman acknowledged that forthright opposition to recruitment would undermine
the AUAM’s influence,104 but she considered assistance for conscientious objectors to be
consistent with the administration’s goals. The Bureau’s ambition, she concluded, was
“to enlist the rank and file of the people, who make for progressivism the country over, in
a movement for a civil solution of this world-wide conflict and fire them with a vision of
the beginnings of the U.S. of the World.”105 Her Progressive confidence convinced her
that administrative insulation and bureaucratic expertise would lead to the just execution
of the law; she believed that the bureau could in fact help the president to execute his
plan of leniency and deference to individual conscience.106
To avoid the perception that the AUAM had eschewed its other objectives,
including its foundational ambition of “lead[ing] the liberal sentiment for peace,”
Eastman proposed a structural reorganization.107 She called upon the AUAM to establish
a “legal bureau for the maintenance of fundamental rights in war time.” Those rights, in
Eastman’s estimation, comprised “free press, free speech, freedom of assembly, and
liberty of conscience.”108 Eastman’s plan, which the board formally enacted in early July,
entailed a change in nomenclature. Rather than a Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau,
which suggested opposition to the administration’s war policy, she suggested a Bureau
for the Maintenance of Civil Liberties.109 The reorganization also betokened a shift in the
bureau’s emphasis: the new bureau would continue to protect conscientious objectors, but
it would situate that project within a broader commitment to personal rights.
The resulting Civil Liberties Bureau framed its wartime agenda as an inexorable
outcrop of the AUAM’s earlier activities. “A Union Against Militarism becomes, during
wartime, inevitably a Union for the Defense of Civil Liberty,” the organization eventually
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explained.110 In reality, there was nothing inevitable about the organization’s change in
tack. On the contrary, both its defense of conscientious objectors and its ensuing
expansion into other aspects of “civil liberty” advocacy were contingent and contested.
Within the AUAM, opposition to the new program stemmed from two principal
sources. The first turned on conservative opposition. The leadership of the AUAM feared
that hawks, patrioteers, and government prosecutors would equate endorsement of
dissenters’ rights with support for their cause, a slippage that civil liberties advocates
would continue to confront in later years.111 The second obstacle, however, was in many
ways more poignant. Progressives within and outside the AUAM were reluctant even to
raise the banner of rights to undermine state policy and majority will.112
Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the
Progressive umbrella encompassed a wide and often conflicting array of projects and
policy commitments, from tenement housing laws and municipal ownership of public
utilities to eugenics and prohibition.113 Among the few features that united these disparate
reformers were a deep distrust of the federal judiciary and an aversion to constitutional
rights-based claims, which together had operated to defeat many of the most important
Progressive initiatives.114 In place of the autonomous individual, the Progressives
championed the common good. Roscoe Pound, the architect of sociological
jurisprudence, was emblematic of the dominant view. Pound believed that the crucial task
of legal doctrine was to “free individual capacities in such a way as to make them
available for the development of the general happiness or common good”115; individual
beliefs warranted protection only to the extent that they promoted the public welfare.116
110
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For the AUAM leadership and many other Progressives, aversion to rights-based
individualism was fundamentally bound up with the struggle between labor and capital.
Classical legal thinkers and, more to the point, judges, had defended private property
because of a misguided belief in natural rights.117 The Progressives, by contrast, regarded
the allocation of wealth as a social function and the protection of property as a political
and legal contingency.118 Under appropriate circumstances, security in property and
personal effects might serve the social welfare. But other economic policies were equally
advisable, including a living wage (which would enhance political participation)119 and
collective bargaining (which would counter the consolidation of wealth).120
The widespread desire to moderate the class struggle and promote social harmony
was a central motivation for Progressive reform.121 Bolstered by the high cost of
workplace tragedies, including the Monongah Mining disaster and the Triangle Shirtwaist
fire, Progressive proposals proliferated during the early twentieth century. States and, in
some cases, federal laws reached such issues as workplace safety, minimum wage,
maximum hours, and workers compensation.122
Measures to buttress organized labor met with more resistance, but labor
advocates too managed a few successes.123 Among their notable achievements was the
the individual interest. Undoubtedly there is such an interest, and there is the same social
interest in securing it as in securing other individual interests of personality. . . . But this
feeling may have an important social interest behind it. For the individual interest in free
belief and opinion must always be balanced with the social interest in the security of
social institutions and the interest of the state in its personality.”).
117
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Manly report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, issued in the
summer of 1915, which documented a pattern of industrial and government collusion to
infringe the rights of labor.124 Created at the instigation of the very same Progressive
social workers who founded the AUAM,125 the Commission was initiated under William
Howard Taft but executed under Wilson.126 Although it included industry and public
representatives in addition to labor, its overall composition skewed left, and its two years
of hearings were far friendlier to labor than industry.127 Among the hundreds of witnesses
who testified was ACLU co-founder Crystal Eastman, who told the Commission that
women “must raise their wages as men have raised their wages, by organization.”128
When the testimony concluded, each camp issued its own findings, but the report
endorsed by Commission chairman Frank P. Walsh was strongly pro-labor and called for
“drastic” changes in the allocation of wealth and federal protection of unions’ right to
collective bargaining as well as federal provisions for social insurance.129 Walsh boasted
that it was “more radical than any report upon industrial subjects ever made by any
government agency.”130 Baldwin, who knew Walsh from his work on juvenile justice,
Although he harbored real reservations about organized labor, Wilson’s many pro-labor
appointees ensured union representation in policymaking and in the resolution of
particular labor disputes. By most accounts, Wilson abandoned his earlier anti-union
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told him that the report would “do more to educate public opinion to the truth of existing
conditions than any other one document in existence.”131
Accomplishments like these bolstered Progressive confidence in state power. By
the mid-1910s, even organized labor had warmed to government intervention.132 One
branch of government, however, consistently stood in the way of progress: again and
again, the judiciary undercut reformers’ most significant gains. The most notorious
example, and a powerful Progressive rallying cry, was the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a New York maximum-hours law because it
interfered with an implicit constitutional “right of free contract.”133 Pet Progressive
projects like the minimum wage, the eight-hour day, and workers compensation all died
at judicial hands.134 And yet, the invalidation of state legislation was neither the most
pervasive judicial device nor the most damaging to organized labor. In the decades before
World War I, employers (and organizations of employers, such as the National
Association of Manufacturers) justified their open shop policies by reference to
individual rights; closed shops, they argued, abridged workers’ freedom by conditioning
employment on their obligation to join the union.135 Moreover, they argued that yellow131
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dog contracts prohibiting workers from joining unions protected individual rights by
linking workers’ duties to those which they had voluntarily assumed.136 Courts agreed on
both fronts, and with a handful of exceptions, they proved ready and willing to enjoin
“coercive” labor practices—particularly efforts by workers to conduct boycotts or to
dissuade strike-breakers.137
The “labor injunction” quickly became the first line of defense for beleaguered
employers.138 Judges often issued ex parte restraining orders unsupported by evidence of
illegal behavior.139 Meanwhile, in Gompers v. Buck’s Stove,140 the United States Supreme
Court held boycotts to be enjoinable under the Sherman Act, rejecting the AFL’s
argument that publication of its “do not patronize” list was protected by the First
Amendment.141 This ruling came just three years after the Court struck down the Erdman
Act’s prohibition on yellow-dog contracts as an unconstitutional infringement on
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workers’ freedom of contract under the Fifth Amendment,142 a holding that it applied to
state anti-yellow-dog laws in 1915.143
The judiciary’s obstinacy on these issues, and its broader hostility to public
regulation, threatened to undermine the Progressive reform agenda—and so Progressives
railed against the judicial construction of the autonomous individual.144 The liberty of an
isolated worker to bargain over the conditions of his (or, increasingly, her145) labor
blinked the reality of the modern labor market. By resting on merely formal rights,
classical legalism exacerbated social tensions.146 The problem with the Lochner-era
judiciary, as Roscoe Pound explained, was its propensity to “exaggerate private right at
the expense of public interest,”147 without taking social circumstances into account. The
Progressives believed that “the strong social interest in the moral and social life of the
individual” outweighed the cost to autonomy of an aggressively interventionist judicial
system.148
These developments were a central presence in the lives and careers of the
members of the AUAM. Most were actively involved in some aspect of improving
workers’ lives. Jane Addams famously worked to mitigate class injustice through social
work, legislative reform, and, sometimes, union activity.149 Lillian Wald (as well as
142
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Addams) helped to found the Women’s Trade Union League.150 Florence Kelley
established the National Consumers’ League and drafted the brief on which the
influential “Brandeis Brief” in Muller v. Oregon was modeled.151 The list goes on. All
were attentive to the advantages of state cooperation and the pitfalls of judicial
intervention. Probably, all were skeptical of individual rights.
The experiences of Crystal Eastman, the AUAM’s executive secretary, are
illustrative. A reformist by upbringing, Eastman was trained as a lawyer but unable, as a
woman, to find work as a practicing attorney.152 Instead, she spent her early career in
sociological research. She had studied political economy at Columbia before switching to
law, and between 1908 and 1910 she applied both sets of skills in her evaluation of
industrial accidents in New York.153 Her analysis as secretary of the Wainwright
Commission, which was created by the New York legislature to study the law of
workplace accidents, steered the state’s legislative effort to a new no-fault compensatory
system in lieu of the outmoded tort rules of employer liability.154 But the high court of
New York struck down the workers’ compensation law Eastman helped to craft as a
violation of employers’ property rights.155
For Eastman and her colleagues, the decision to aid the cause of anti-militarism
by invoking constitutional rights to inhibit state power was a remarkable development.
The AUAM’s leadership saw the state as an ally in the struggle against industrial
inequality, and individual rights—especially judicially enforceable ones—as threats to
democracy. It is not enough to assert that the defense of conscientious objectors grew out
of the AUAM’s opposition to war. Espousing a theory of individual autonomy threatened
to prop up the very constitutional regime that the organization’s founders habitually
decried.
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II. The Limits of Conscience
In June 1917, the AUAM announced its “war time program.”156 Its second
objective, “a just and lasting peace,” was the organization’s standard fare.157 It called for
a clear statement of America’s peace terms and publication of international agreements,
and it aspired toward “world federation” once hostilities ceased.158 Roger Baldwin,
however, had a different and more immediate program in mind. His project, developed in
cooperation with Crystal Eastman, fell under the heading “against militarism.”159 It
entailed opposition to the permanent establishment of conscription, legal advice to
conscientious objectors, and above all, the preservation of “civil liberty in war time.”160
In other work, I explore Progressives’ gradual embrace of individual rights over
the course of the 1920s and 1930s. I also examine the ACLU’s rehabilitation of the courts
as a forum for Progressive change.161 Here, I take up an antecedent question: namely, the
AUAM’s brief flirtation with exemption claims grounded in freedom of conscience, and
its subsequent retreat to other, more palatable personal rights.
The AUAM experimented with various justifications for exemption from military
service. Sometimes, it cast liberty of conscience as an individual right (conscience is
“nothing if it is not individual,” it explained162). Eschewing the ordinary Progressive
emphasis on public utility, it conjured an “Anglo-Saxon tradition for which our ancestors
fought and died.”163 It linked this commitment to the “free exercise of religion according
to the dictates of creed and conscience,” which it cast as an “established and cherished
right.”164
The extent to which the tradition the AUAM described was respected in practice
is, of course, a contentious question.165 Certainly, appeals to freedom of conscience had
strong colonial roots, but it seems unlikely that founding-era judges and politicians
anticipated judicial carve-outs of the kind the Supreme Court created in the twentieth
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century.166 As a matter of legislative dispensation and prosecutorial non-enforcement, by
contrast, exemptions from generally applicable laws probably occurred with some
regularity.167 In fact, the principal example was exemption from military service, which
many statutes and state constitutions provided—contingent on payment or substitute
service—despite opposition from dominant religious groups.168 Still, it is reasonably clear
that the historic case for exemptions was premised on denominational affiliation or, at
least, religious belief.169 With few exceptions, proponents of exemptions described a
tension between competing spheres of sovereignty, worldly and spiritual, not the
preservation of individual autonomy against the encroachment of state power.170
166
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And yet, by the 1910s (when references to “conscience” in the Survey were
routinely preceded by the modifier “public”171), arguments for exemption smacked
suspiciously of Lochner-style individual rights. When conservatives invoked civil
liberty—as they did often during the war—they worried about property (specifically, the
judicial policing of property rights) rather than personal freedom.172 Nonetheless, their
language invoked the state’s interference with “individual freedom” and its intrusion on
“intimate concerns.”173 As Norman Thomas observed, the same conservatives who
accused conscientious objectors of antisocial attitudes were “rampant individualists” who
routinely rejected proposals for the “conscription of wealth.”174
Conservatives were not alone in attacking state power. Over the previous decade,
anarchists and free lovers had seized on state-skeptical constitutionalism, as well. Just
months before passage of the Selective Service Act, Margaret Sanger ambitiously if
unavailingly went so far as to challenge birth control laws for infringing her “absolute
right of enjoyment of intercourse unless the act be so conducted that pregnancy be the
result”—a restriction she deemed incompatible with “her free exercise of conscience and
pursuit of happiness.”175 Lawyers for the Free Speech League, founded in 1920s, had
pursued constitutional litigation as well as publicity and political persuasion to advance
the free speech cause.176 Its head, Theodore Schroeder, championed such “personal
liberties” as Sunday regulations, public expenditures by religious institutions, the
suppression of secularists and free-thought lecturers, land gifts to sectarian institutions,
bible study in the public schools, and tax exemptions for church property.177 Although it
governments,” and “[g]overnment involvement in disputes over the rights of religious
institutions traditionally protected individual conscience rather than institutional
autonomy.” Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church
Power and Property Before the Civil War, 162 PENN. L. REV 307, 313, 372 (2014).
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never won a significant victory in court,178 the League pushed some Progressives to
question whether a First Amendment trump on legislative will might occasionally serve
useful ends.179 Notably, it justified free speech by reference to personal autonomy as well
as social utility and the greater good.180
For most Progressives, however, democratic citizenship was a collective
endeavor, and society could not afford to countenance the selfish exercise of individual
rights. “True liberty,” according to one prominent Progressive theologian, “mean[t] the
voluntary sacrifice of self for the common life.”181 Thus the AUAM was hard pressed to
square conscientious objection to war with the Progressive worldview. In its pamphlets
and publications, the organization claimed that liberty of conscience was a means toward
“social progress.”182 It subsequently explained that “[p]rogress begins with unpopular
minorities, and we endanger society when we imprison heretics and agitators.”183 It
endorsed an account by British economist John A. Hobson, who argued that stateenforced conformism would lead to “despotism” and encourage uncritical submission to
arbitrary rule.184 It also reprinted the work of Norman Angell, whose essay “Why
Freedom Matters” justified conscientious objection as an exercise in pluralism.185 Angell
the possible narrowing of the issues to economic liberty with a maximum Pacifist
leaning. This seems to me to involve a possible neglect of the more personal liberties
which are being very much invaded.”). On the League’s activities, see RABBAN, supra
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urged the interrogation of all sacred institutions, including private property, and asked
why wealth was protected when human life was “forfeit to the safety of the State.”186
Invoking “utility” rather than “any conception of abstract ‘right’—jus, droit, recht,” he
enjoined the state to protect the “right of individual conscience to the expression of its
convictions,” the “right of the heretic to his heresy.”187 By exercising private judgment,
Angell argued, citizens would also develop their public judgment.188 Society as a whole
would benefit by tolerating a diversity of beliefs.
At first, the AUAM found fertile ground for such arguments in some Progressive
circles, which promoted tolerance on the basis of cultural pluralism as well as state
security (unwilling soldiers, after all, were bad for morale and unreliable in battle). The
president had assured Americans that the draft was “in no sense a conscription of the
unwilling.”189 In that spirit, the New Republic—which, in Crystal Eastman’s estimation,
was practically “the administration’s own organ”190—emphasized the “democratic
purposes” underlying conscription.191 The draft was intended to introduce efficiency into
military organization, not to “coerc[e] unwilling minorities into the firing line”;
“show[ing] every consideration to conscientious objectors” had never been more
essential.192 Within the War Department, some important officials agreed,193 though it
bears emphasis that they promoted tolerance as a matter of legislative or administrative
accommodation, not a trump on democratic processes imposed by judicial decree.
To a considerable extent, “lenient administration of the Conscription Act” was
what the AUAM was after.194 It is no surprise, then, that the organization initially
pursued a cooperative strategy. In an era when government lacked information about its
citizens, many men—perhaps as many as three million—evaded the draft by declining to
register.195 Somewhat reluctantly, the AUAM advised objectors to take a different and
186

ANGELL, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 185, at27; ANGELL,
supra note 185.
187
ANGELL, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 185.
188
ANGELL, supra note 185, at 19.
189
President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation 1370 (May 18, 1917); Letter from Crystal
Eastman to the Executive Committee (June 14, 1917), AUAM Papers, reel 10-1.
190
Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Executive Committee (June 14, 1917), AUAM
Papers, Reel 10-1.
191
The Success of Selective Service, NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 1917, at 149.
192
Id.
193
Jeremy Kessler has connected this accommodationist strain among War Department
officials to Progressives’ endorsement of national self-determination. Kessler, supra note
8, at 1115.
194
Letter from Crystal Eastman to the Executive Committee (June 14, 1917), AUAM
Papers, Reel 10-1.
195 CAPOZOLLA, supra note 7, at 30. These “slackers” were not captured within the
small number of official conscientious objectors. On the ensuing “slacker raids,” see
id. at 41–53. According to the ACLU, only a “small proportion” of those who failed to
register were motivated by “genuinely conscientious scruples against participation

29

riskier course: to register and to state their grounds for requesting exemption.196 As one
AUAM statement put it (somewhat ambivalently), “Obedience to law, to the utmost limit
of conscience” was “the basis of good citizenship.”197 And according to the AUAM,
conscientious objectors were model citizens. Few of them desired to save their own souls
at the expense of national security, Norman Thomas emphasized.198 Rather, the typical
objector believed “that his religion or his social theory in the end can save what is
precious in the world far better without than with this stupendously destructive war.”199
To most Progressives, however, such judgments were properly assigned to
representative government, not the vagaries of individual preferences or the dictates of
sectarian scruples.200 By June, the esteemed historian and philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy
expressed a view held by many Progressives when, writing in the New Republic, he
ascribed to conscientious objectors an “anti-social attitude and mode of conduct.”201 One
month later, John Dewey chose the same forum for his article Conscience and
Compulsion, in which he indicted evangelical Protestantism for “locat[ing] morals in
personal feelings instead of in the control of social situations.”202 Consistent with the
Progressive attack on legal formalism, Dewey also blamed the American legal tradition,
which had “bred the habit of attaching feelings to fixed rules and injunctions instead of to
social conditions and consequences of action as these are revealed to the scrutiny of
intelligence.”203 A “more social and less personal and evangelical method,” he argued,
would emphasize “objective facts” instead of the “inhibitions of inner consciousness.”204
In an August 1917 article for the Survey,205 Norman Thomas responded directly to
Dewey’s position. Where Dewey attributed to conscientious objectors a “merely personal
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morality,” Thomas cast their moral stand in social terms. Compulsory service and war
itself were more deeply “anti-social” than refusal to serve.206 What conscientious
objectors believed, according to Thomas, was “that the same course of action which
keeps one’s self ‘unspotted … within’” (Dewey’s words) would “ultimately prove the
only safe means for establishing a worthy social system.”207 And yet, while some
Progressives were willing to accept moderation as a “matter of expedience or of sound
public policy,” Thomas went too far when he insisted on “the recognition of
conscientious objection as a matter of democratic right.”208 Dewey urged the
authorities to assign conscientious objectors whatever work would “put the least heavy
load possible upon their consciences,”209 and he counseled humane treatment for those
who were imprisoned.210 Moreover, he criticized Columbia’s dismissal of Professor
James M. Cattell for, among other issues, advocating a bill to protect conscientious
objectors.211 But he declined to endorse a broad right to exemption of the kind that
Thomas promoted.
The AUAM’s Civil Liberties Bureau, announced on July 2, 1917, was at once
more palatable to the organization’s Progressive constituency and less beholden to
traditional Progressive practices.212 Eastman maintained that the organization’s “attempt
to have the conscription act administered with due regard to liberty of conscience” was
no more antagonistic to the nation’s war effort than its “attempt to save free speech, free
press and assembly from the wholesale autocratic sweep which war-efficiency
dictates.”213 That she felt compelled to argue the point is a telling indication of its
precariousness. In defending the rights of conscientious objectors, the AUAM demanded
special dispensation from the ordinary operations of democratic laws. Expressive
freedom, by contrast, was more easily reconcilable than conscientious objection to the
Progressive vision of the public good.
To be sure, wartime enforcement of free speech proved almost as tepid in practice
as freedom of conscience.214 In debate over the Espionage Act, some legislators
maintained that the best way to promote the public interest was to foster open discussion
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even for those with whom one disagreed.215 The final bill neglected their concerns, and
the Department of Justice and the federal courts adopted an expansive interpretation of its
scope.216 Postal censorship was particularly intrusive, and it revealed the dangers of
administrative power.217
Nonetheless, free speech clearly enjoyed substantial support as a theoretical
matter, even among advocates of the war.218 In the early 1910s, a broad range of thinkers,
advocates, and public officials had endorsed expressive freedom at the level of legislative
drafting and executive enforcement, if not judicial review.219 Progressives had long
expressed their opposition to unjust laws, from local anti-picketing ordinances to the
repressive court decisions that they associated with Lochner. Under peacetime
conditions, they endorsed vigorous public discussion and encouraged public officials to
tolerate advocacy for social and economic change.220 After all, the Progressive Era
experienced swift transformations in political, scientific, and cultural values.221 Theories
that were widely accepted in the 1910s had been marginal, if not repressed, a few decades
earlier. Social progress turned on the formulation and expression of new ideas, and
repression often served the interests of the established and empowered. A 1927 history of
civil liberties commissioned by the ACLU identified a new openness to free speech
during the Progressive period, arising “partly out of a new realization of its essential
value in our complex industrial age; partly out of the common experiences of the social
reformers; partly because of the increased number of cases in which liberty was
sacrificed to the interests of powerful conservative groups.”222
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The AUAM leadership hoped to parlay that constellation of interests into support
for its wartime program. “[I]n a war for democracy,” it insisted in August 1917, “there is
no more patriotic duty than to keep democracy alive at home.”223True, many Progressives
believed the time for public debate had passed once war was declared. Some emphasized
the government’s power to police interference with majority will.224 “As units of
democracy we are bound by the national decision,” one correspondent advised Roger
Baldwin.225 Others, arguing that “the world will not be safe for free speech until it is safe
for democracy,” believed the war effort justified extraordinary measures.226 “It would be
a good thing for all of us if we emphasized a little more our duties as citizens and were
less concerned about insisting upon our ‘rights,’” the general secretary of the American
Prison Association wrote to Roger Baldwin.227 “Personally, I am perfectly willing to have
the Government suspend whatever may be necessary of my own civil rights during the
period of the war, if it will help win the war, and I have no fear whatever but that when
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Germany and her Allies have been licked to a frazzle that I shall be restored to the full
enjoyment of all the civil rights I am capable of appreciating.”228
Some Progressives, however, were less sanguine about the wartime suspension of
civil liberties. To them, meaningful “social freedom” necessarily entailed “the right of
propaganda by speech, press, and assemblage.”229 Thus one eminent sociologist agreed to
endorse a meeting on behalf of civil liberties if its goal was “to secure free and adequate
public discussion of every public policy before a decision is reached on that policy.”230
By the same token, the Nation maintained that “the right to free speech must be upheld,
throughout the country”—that “freedom of legitimate criticism” must not be denied.”231
Perhaps most famously, John Dewey made a conflicted and belated plea for open
debate in a series of essays for the New Republic.232 In September 1917, Dewey played
down the prospect of wartime repression of “liberty of thought and speech.”233 In fact, he
reflected with amusement on the irony of “ultra-socialists rallying to the old banner of
Elihu Root with its inscription to the sanctity of individual rights and constitutional
guaranties.”234 To the extent he acknowledged the cost of patriotic conformity, he
focused on the futility of repression as an instrument of “social solidarity.”235 Over the
ensuing weeks, in the face of mounting national hysteria and the pointed criticism of his
former student Randolph Bourne, Dewey acknowledged that he had misjudged the
likelihood of broad-based censorship.236 Like other speech-friendly Progressives, he
promoted pluralism in social rather than individualist terms, and he resisted the notion
that individual judgment should trump the democratic will.237
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Such arguments bore a close kinship to Zechariah Chafee’s iconic defense of
expressive freedom in the aftermath of the war, which eventually justified a courtcentered and countermajoritarian theory of free speech. According to Chafee, the First
Amendment protected two distinct kinds of interests in expressive freedom.238 The first
was an individual interest, “the need of many men to express their opinions on matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living.” The second, by contrast, was “a social interest
in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of
action but carry it out in the wisest way.239 In Chafee’s view, judges mistakenly regarded
free speech as “merely an individual interest,” subject to curtailment whenever national
security was at stake.240 In fact, the social interest in expressive freedom was more
important than its individual counterpart, especially in wartime, when courts credited it
least.241 The crucial thing, for Chafee, was to preserve open channels for democratic
deliberation. In this, his position tracked that of the New York Times, which defended as
“indubitable” the right of conscientious objectors “to disapprove,” even while it
prescribed imprisonment for those who persisted in their refusal to serve after failing to
persuade Congress to “change the law.”242
As the parameters of Progressive tolerance became increasingly apparent, the
Civil Liberties Bureau explored alternative avenues for pursuing its goals. The
organization’s new methods borrowed heavily from the prewar tactics of Theodore
Schroeder’s Free Speech League, which had always been careful to separate its advocacy
for expressive freedom from the goals of the groups it represented.243 Like the League,
the Civil Liberties Bureau defended civil liberties by reference to the Constitution as well
as public policy. Like the League, it bucked Progressive preferences by pursuing civil
liberties in the courts as well as the political branches.
By the beginning of the war, the Free Speech League was fading from public
view. Nonetheless, many of the League’s most important members and allies played
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formative roles in the Civil Liberties Bureau. Theodore Schroeder sent background
materials on free speech to the Bureau’s Lawyers Advisory Council early on.245 He also
provided Baldwin with a complete set of the League’s published pamphlets.246 Gilbert
Roe, a League lawyer who was a former law partner of Wisconsin Republican Robert La
Follette, was actively involved in the new organization and provided frequent legal
advice.247
Harry Weinberger, an attorney who had worked closely with the Free Speech
League and would soon represent the defendant in Abrams v. United States, was
especially influential.248 Weinberger was a single-taxer, pacifist, and radical individualist
who opposed all state interference with personal liberties.249 He had fought against
compulsory vaccination in the early 1910s, and he considered the Supreme Court’s
decision upholding the practice to be on a par with Dred Scott.250 He had also defended
Emma Goldman against charges of distributing birth control in in 1916.251
A stalwart opponent of the draft, Weinberger eagerly joined Goldman and
Alexander Berkman’s No-Conscription League, which was “formed for the purpose of
encouraging conscientious objectors to affirm their liberty of conscience and to make
their objection to human slaughter effective by refusing to participate in the killing of
their fellow men.”252 Core to the League’s mission was its opposition to state coercion,
war-related or otherwise. Its members opposed conscription on grounds of
internationalism, anti-militarism, and anti-capitalism.253 “We will fight for what we
choose to fight for; we will never fight simply because we are ordered to fight,” its
manifesto proclaimed.254 As Goldman explained in a public address, her convictions as
an anarchist likewise prevented her from advising draftees not to register, because she did
“not believe in force morally or otherwise” to persuade them to betray their ideals.255
One’s own conscience, she insisted, was the “best guide in all the world.”256
For Weinberger, freedom of conscience was part of a broader constellation of
personal rights that merited protection during war. Early on, he sensed a need for a new
organization to protect civil liberties. In April 1917, he shared with Roger Baldwin his
idea for an American Legal Defense League to “fight all cases in the United States where
245
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free speech, free press or the right peaceably to assemble or to petition the government is
invaded.”257 Baldwin had already expressed interest in civil liberties. On April 14, less
than two weeks after the declaration of war, he had begun soliciting prominent
signatories to request an official statement of Wilson’s position on freedom of speech,
press, and assemblage.258 But he had not yet built an organizational apparatus for
vindicating those freedoms.
Weinberger suggested that the AUAM could assist him with his plan for a legal
defense organization by referring cases to him through its local branches, and he urged a
constitutional test case of conscription.259 He also offered his opinions on the
constitutional status of dissenting speech for inclusion in an AUAM pamphlet.260 He
advised Baldwin that open disagreement with government and military practices,
including the publication and distribution of pamphlets on the war, was protected by the
First Amendment, and he was adamant that “any Espionage Bill Congress may pass
cannot repeal the United States Constitution.”261 By May, he was outraged at the
Administration’s efforts to quash public opposition to military bills and concluded “that
we must re-educate the people, that they have the right to discuss and the right to oppose
conscription and ask for its repeal.”262 Advocacy of a change in law, he insisted, could
not qualify as treasonable or seditious.263
Baldwin initially supported Weinberger’s organizational aspirations. A pamphlet
issued in May by the Bureau’s short-lived Committee on Constitutional Rights did
precisely what Weinberger advised. It declared that “constitutional rights are being
seriously invaded throughout the United States under pressure of war,” blaming the abuse
on “petty officials who would compel conformity.”264 And it referred victims of this
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unconstitutional abuse to the American Legal Defense League.265 The League, in turn,
attracted substantial publicity in Progressive circles. Its notable members included
Charles C. Burlingham, Theodore Schroeder, Gilbert Roe, Clarence Darrow, and New
York Governor Charles S. Whitman, as well as several AUAM board members.266 In
May, the New Republic “gladly” printed an announcement of the new organization,
which was “composed of public spirited citizens including both militarists and antimilitarists, who think it imperative that our American liberties of free speech, free press
and the right peaceably to assemble be legally defended against any encroachment
wherever made by any public official.”267 Even Newton Baker implied approval of the
League’s agenda. In a letter, he commended its opposition to vigilante interference with
“the rights of assembly and free speech”—an endorsement that the League publicized to
good effect.268
Given the substantial support for the American Legal Defense League, it is
unsurprising that Roger Baldwin (known for his opportunism or organizational savvy,
depending on one’s perspective) quickly encroached on its agenda. On May 11, the
Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau convinced Weinberger to relinquish all cases involving
conscientious objectors—a course that Weinberger accepted given that his advisory
committee was interested only in the rights of speech, press, and assembly.269 In addition,
Baldwin secured Weinberger’s agreement to cede any legal test of the Conscription or
Espionage Acts to the AUAM.270 In June, he pushed harder. With apologies “that the
American Union was very poorly standing by you and the American Legal Defense
League”—a fickleness that Baldwin blamed on dissension within the AUAM—he
withdrew an earlier pledge of financial assistance.271 More to the point, he advised
Weinberger that the AUAM had “decided now to take hold of the work of organizing
legal defense throughout the country under a bureau of the Union, and including
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conscientious objectors.”272 The new Civil Liberties Bureau appropriated the League’s
entire agenda. Its purpose, according to the AUAM’s public announcement, was to
coordinate all parties interested in preserving “constitutional liberties” against
government incursion.273 A second edition of the AUAM’s pamphlet on constitutional
rights, issued in July, omitted any mention of the American Legal Defense League.274
The Civil Liberties Bureau did not abandon tested Progressive tactics altogether.
On the contrary, it pursued its program through all available means. For the duration of
the war, its leadership drew on personal and professional connections with government
officials.275 When the Bureau organized an emergency conference on postal censorship of
radical publications, its first line of attack was to send a delegation of lawyers to discuss
the matter with key figures in the Wilson administration, including the president and the
postmaster general.276 Over the following months, the new bureau tried its hand at
lobbying, propaganda, and grassroots organizing in addition to negotiation.277 Still, its
principal focus was constitutional litigation, just as Weinberger had proposed. The
Bureau quickly established itself as a national clearinghouse for information and legal aid
in the domain of constitutional rights.278 Baldwin envisioned it as a means of helping
dissenters to “get their legal rights before the courts.”279
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A handful of successful cases in the summer of 1917 encouraged the litigation
strategy.280 Within a few months, the Bureau claimed 120 cooperating attorneys
throughout the United States.281 At that time, a number of important prosecutions under
the Espionage and Trading with the Enemy Acts were coming to the organization’s
attention as a result of the “activity of government agents,” and its staff was assisting
“test cases under the new legislation which must be carried to the higher courts for final
decision on constitutional points.”282 Cases were proliferating at every level, from local to
federal, and under local ordinances and state laws as well as federal statutes.283 The
Bureau was also handling trial publicity to “show up miscarriage of justice.”284 Although
it operated primarily to redress repression after the fact, its long-term hope was to
discourage unlawful interference in the first place by reminding officials that a national
body was scrutinizing their actions.285 The overarching purpose of the Civil Liberties
Bureau was to “make sure that bureaucratic officials and mob-minded judges shall not,
out of sheer war passion, trample upon the rights of free speech, free press and public
assembly during war-time.”286

III. Civil Liberties in Practice
Despite its early achievements in the courts, the Civil Liberties Bureau failed to
attain the respectability its founders desired. The comparatively tolerant climate of
spring 1917 was rapidly eroding, and announcement of the Civil Liberties Bureau met
with public indignation. A July 4 editorial in the New York Times insisted that a line must
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be drawn between “liberty” and “license,” and “just where it shall be drawn is and must
be determined, in countries properly called free, by public sentiment as formally
expressed by majorities through their voluntarily chosen representatives.”287 It
unequivocally denounced the “little group of malcontents who for present purposes have
chosen to call themselves ‘The National Civil Liberties Bureau,’” whose objective, it
alleged, was to secure “for themselves immunity from the application of laws to which
good citizens willingly submit as essential to the national existence and welfare.”288
The Bureau’s chilly reception exacerbated tensions within the AUAM. In large
part, the schism stemmed from the diverging politics of the leadership. Much of the
organization’s inner circle openly supported radical causes, and in August, the board
voted to send delegates to a conference organized by the People’s Council of America for
Democracy and Peace, a radical anti-war group to which many of its members
belonged.289 Lillian Wald worried that the decision to participate in the conference would
destroy the AUAM’s reputation and undermine its broader program. The AUAM had
“stood before the public as a group of reflective liberals,” she pleaded, unavailingly.290 Its
cooperation with the People’s Council betrayed an “impulsive radicalism” instead.291
Other members shared her concerns. Oswald Garrison Villard felt that the
Administration’s conscription policy had accommodated the Union’s legitimate requests,
and he wanted the organization to withdraw all objectionable materials from the mail,
disband its Publicity Department and Washington office, and retreat from public view.292
In late summer, Wald threatened resignation, and Eastman responded with a
proposal to sever the Civil Liberties Bureau from the AUAM—to cull the radicals and
“leave the more conservative minority to continue the work of the organization.”293 The
board agreed (Wald left anyway), and the AUAM soon withered into obsolescence.294
The Civil Liberties Bureau, by contrast, intensified its operations;295 Norman Thomas
287
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explained that the kind of liberal organization advocated by Villard and Wald would
“have to originate, if at all, with those who have not been so deeply tarred with
uncompromising pacifism as all our present members.”296
On October 17, the new National Civil Liberties Bureau opened its doors.297 The
leadership assured members that its program would remain “exactly the same”298: the
“maintenance in war time of the rights of free press, free speech, peaceful assembly,
liberty of conscience, and freedom from unlawful search and seizure.”299 In reality, the
NCLB leadership was especially concerned for the rights of radicals and organized labor.
As Thomas put it, “capitalistic exploitation, militarism, [and] contempt of civil liberties”
were entangled “aspects of the wrong basis of our social life.”300 According to Baldwin,
the “underlying purpose” of the NCLB’s attempt to maintain constitutional rights was to
shield minorities in the “processes of progress,” in which “labor of course must in the
future play the biggest part.”301
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Still, the NCLB promised publicly to support the administration, which was
“doing its best under the present law.”302 By exerting “quiet pressure” on government
officials, it hoped to persuade them to exercise lenience in administering the Selective
Service Act, among other provisions.303 And to a modest yet surprising extent, the
organization achieved that objective.
The negotiations between the NCLB and the War Department with respect to
conscientious objectors are well documented.304 The organization had strong ties to
Frederick Keppel, the Third Assistant Secretary of War305—who, as secretary of the
American Association for International Conciliation, had once said that “war and
civilization can no longer go hand and hand.”306 In the spring of 1917, Baldwin assured
Keppel that the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau would cooperate fully with his office,
and Keppel graciously acknowledged the organization’s collaborative posture.307 Bureau
members met with key personnel within and outside the War Department to urge
moderation in administering conscription.308 Felix Frankfurter, who was serving as a
special assistant to the Secretary of War, was particularly receptive. Indeed, he authored
an influential memorandum endorsing many of Baldwin’s innovations and urging
humane treatment, if not exemption, even of absolutists and political objectors.309 Baker
himself promised to give weight to Baldwin’s recommendations in setting the
Department’s policy,310 and he eventually ordered leniency toward individuals whose
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“personal scruples,” whether religious or political, informed their opposition to military
service.311
In practice, however, objectors of all types, and especially the absolutists, often
suffered in the individual cantonments.312 The military was adamantly opposed to the
AUAM’s program, and it pushed back against sympathetic executive officials.313 Baker’s
policy left immense discretion to the camp commanders, some of whom were subjecting
objectors to brutal treatment and allowing other inductees to beat them.314 Baldwin tried,
but eventually failed, to position the Bureau as a watchdog group that would
communicate with objectors and report abusive treatment to government officials.315 He
nonetheless remained reluctant to challenge the War Department head-on. In a September
1917 letter to Felix Frankfurter, Baldwin conveyed his concern that “the rumors that are
coming from the cantonments [would] give rise to an unfortunate propaganda from
several points in the country.”316 In other words, the NCLB would not itself generate
publicity on behalf of the objectors, nor would it openly criticize the camps for known
abuses.317 Rather, Baldwin raised the specter of damaging propaganda as an incentive to
temper abuses and formulate a more generous policy.318 For a time, Baldwin had reason
to believe his approach would yield results.319 “We are getting much more liberal
treatment from the War Department,” he wrote, “than we could possibly expect by
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throwing the issue into the public press, and into the hands of the patriotic organizations
who are anxious to shoot or export all the objectors.”320
But by the spring of 1918, Baldwin’s decision to tolerate the situation quietly
seemed naïve. Baldwin knew that cruel punishments, including manacling and solitary
confinement, were rampant in the cantonments.321 Matters worsened when reports
emerged that the army was court-martialing political objectors and meting out excessive
sentences.322 Lenetta Cooper of the American Liberty Defense League, based in Chicago,
had complied with Baldwin’s earlier requests to refrain from publicity.323 In March, she
accused his organization of failure and, worse, of abandoning its constituency.324 After
ten months of work, the conscientious objector was “still considered a slacker by
practically every one,” she told him.325 She reminded Baldwin that her own group had
wanted “to appeal to the people to demand a liberal solution of the problem;”326 he had
begged her not to act, claiming that publicity would precipitate a broad-based attack on
pacifists by the press and would undercut their aims.327 Cooper acknowledged that
popular mobilization would have been slow and open criticism of Baker futile, but she
felt that behind-the-scenes negotiations stood no chance of success without broad popular
support.328 Even then, Baldwin stood his ground:
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I have felt right along that in the uncertainty of a definite policy by the
government, the best thing we could do was to just bide our time, and make the
whole issue clear when the government’s policy is announced. That I understand
from advices received today will be in the very near future.329
Sure enough, less than two weeks later President Wilson issued an executive
order permitting objectors to elect non-combatant service.330 For a brief time, Baldwin
felt vindicated.331 The new policy, however, proved subject to widespread abuse, and
Baldwin’s initial enthusiasm quickly soured.332 Despite a series of clarifying orders from
Baker, objectors who refused non-combatant service out of absolutist convictions were
worse off than before.333 Baker appointed a Board of Inquiry to examine the sincerity of
objectors, and the AUAM was enthusiastic about its members: Major Walter G. Kellogg
for the army, Judge Julian M. Mack (an AUAM supporter before the war), and Columbia
dean Harlan Fisk Stone.334 Notwithstanding its promising personnel, however, the board
habitually found political objectors “insincere.”335
Although the NLCB stubbornly maintained its optimistic veneer, it is likely that
its leaders understood the limits of administrative negotiation. They adhered to their
promise to refrain from negative publicity, but they never entirely abandoned other
avenues of change. In fact, even as the NCLB pledged unmitigated cooperation with the
War Department, it pursued invalidation of the Selective Service Act on constitutional
grounds.336
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To be sure, the NCLB’s objective in its draft act challenge was always a long
shot. The organization had attained a few successes contesting convictions of anti-war
dissenters, but the cases in which judges invalidated speech and assembly laws on
constitutional grounds involved local ordinances, not federal statutes.337 To the extent
judges reviewed convictions under federal wartime legislation, they relied on statutory
interpretation or procedural irregularities, not constitutional infirmities. Judge Learned
Hand’s celebrated decision in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten338 is the most familiar
example. Denial of second-class mailing privileges to The Masses—a radical political
magazine edited by Max Eastman, Crystal Eastman’s brother—helped steer the NCLB
toward civil liberties work when the Espionage Act first passed.339 In late July, Judge
Hand issued his decision: Congress had not authorized the kind of censorship at stake in
the case, namely, the suppression of The Masses for its antiwar editorials and political
cartoons.340 Even Judge Hand’s cautiously reasoned statutory analysis succumbed to
patriotic fervor, however, and in early November, the Second Circuit reversed.341 Similar
cases followed throughout the country.342
More to the point, the NCLB’s sporadic judicial successes during the fall of 1917
involved claims to expressive freedom, not freedom of conscience. The NCLB’s binders
of press clippings bulged with reports of convictions for failure to register for the draft
and of failed constitutional challenges to the Selective Service Act.343 On one occasion,
337
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Judge Hand resisted the prevailing hysteria by admitting a conscientious objector to bail
pending resolution of his constitutional challenge to conscription.344 But bail, however
controversial, was far from a victory. Two weeks after the indictment, a jury deliberated
two minutes before returning a verdict of guilty, and Judge Martin T. Manton sentenced
the defendant to prison at once.345 Even as lower courts divided over the reach of
administrative censorship, the drafters of the Selective Service Act were confident that
“every possible legal contingency was cared for” and that no constitutional challenge to
conscription could succeed.346 In December 1917, the Supreme Court considered
convictions under the Selective Service Act in Minnesota, Ohio, Georgia, and New
York.347 The solicitor general deemed the claims “frivolous,” and were it not for
widespread press coverage, he would not have bothered to “appear and refute them.”348
In the conformist climate of fall 1917, then, the NCLB’s constitutional assault on
conscription was largely a symbolic gesture. Still, it was an important marker of the
NCLB’s ambivalent relationship to state power, judicial review, and constitutional rights.
Walter Nelles, the law partner of one of Baldwin’s Harvard classmates, signed on as
NCLB counsel after reading about the new organization in the New York Times.349 In
drafting the NCLB’s amicus brief in the conscription case, Nelles was adamant that the
organization center its objection on liberty of conscience, not on the less controversial
argument that Congress lacked power to raise a draft and compel service abroad.350
In that attitude, Nelles joined the company of Harry Weinberger, who had agreed
to represent Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman when they were indicted under the
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Selective Service Act in June.351 In trial and on appeal, Weinberger argued that the
narrow exemptions in the statute infringed religious liberty.352 Defending one anarchist
who refused to register out of opposition to “uniformed murder”—that is, war “waged by
governments”353—he argued that the law’s limited exemptions functionally impeded
individual religious choice; it steered putative objectors to join a particular church “in
order to get the protection of the Constitution which is guaranteed to all.”354 Moreover,
by conferring special privileges on members of certain well-recognized organizations, the
conscription act ran afoul of the Establishment Clause.355
The NCLB’s amicus brief echoed Weinberger’s claims.356 It recognized great
variation in the convictions and worldviews of conscientious objectors. “Some base their
beliefs and conduct upon their duty towards God; others upon their duty towards Man,”
Nelles explained.357 But whatever their motivations, the nation’s “fundamental law,”358
including the First Amendment as well as the Ninth (which preserved the people’s
unenumerated “natural rights”359), extended them protection. Nelles conceded that in the
eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, when “[n]early every one’s sacred beliefs had
relation with a Deity,” it might have been reasonable to limit exemptions to recognized
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religious sects.360 In the twentieth, by contrast, organized religion was on the decline.361
The Supreme Court had long since severed the connection between sect and
conscience.362 In recent decades, religion had altogether “escaped . . from theology;”
modernity had rent the ties between “right and wrong” and a “putative Maker.”363 Citing
William James for the proposition that atheism, “psychologically considered, is
indistinguishable from religious zeal,”364 Nelles believed it was the “psychological fact,
not its theological suit of clothes, which the First Amendment to the Constitution
protects.”365
Relying on Ex Parte Milligan,366 Nelles rejected the principle espoused by such
legal luminaries as Elihu Root that constitutional protections were subordinate to claims
of necessity during times of national crisis.367 To be sure, “the right to conform conduct
to conscience” could occasionally be curtailed.368 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Reynolds v. United States,369 which rejected Mormons’ claim for constitutional
exemption from the federal anti-bigamy law, had allowed for the regulation of conduct
that (as Nelles put it) “outrage[d] the moral sense of the community.”370 On that score,
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however, the government lacked a leg to stand on. After all, it was death, not refusal to
kill, that properly “shock[ed] that moral sense.”371
Nelles’s indictment of violence stood out in a brief otherwise notable for its
pluralistic deference. Where others extolled expressive freedom for its propensity to
expose the truth, Nelles thought truth was elusive, if it existed at all. “[S]ince everything
human is fallible,” he argued, “there is no authoritative criterion of the rightness of
anything.”372 Indeed, “the blindest arbitrary assumption has at least the chance of being
as right as reason.”373
Unsurprisingly, Nelles’s relativism failed to persuade the Supreme Court (whose
Chief Justice had interrupted one attorney’s oral argument to rebuke him for his
“unpatriotic” insinuation that the war lacked popular support).374 Like the government’s
brief, the Court all but ignored the objectors’ appeal to liberty of conscience. Indeed, it
“pass[ed] without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of a
religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First
Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act,” because it considered the
“unsoundness” of the argument “too apparent to require” anything more.375
In upholding the Selective Service Act, the Court emphasized the expansive reach
of federal power.376 In so doing, it abandoned its solicitude for individual autonomy in
cases involving property rights and freedom of contract. The inconsistency was
particularly striking in light of the Court’s notorious decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke
Company v. Mitchell just one month prior.377 In that case, a six-justice majority upheld an
injunction against the United Mine Workers for attempting to recruit non-union workers,
who had signed yellow-dog contracts in keeping with their “constitutional rights of
personal liberty and private property.” On December 22, 1917—after oral argument in
the conscription cases, but before the Court’s decision was handed down—the New
Republic published an editorial on Hitchman Cole & Coke. “The decision,” it mused,
371
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would “confirm the popular feeling … that a majority of the Supreme Court are
endeavoring to enforce their own reactionary views of public policy, in direct opposition
to the more enlightened views prevailing in legislatures and among the public.”378 It is no
wonder that the NCLB’s constitutional strategy in the draft act challenge attracted little
Progressive support.
As for conservatives, the American Bar Association and its corporate allies loudly
decried the administration’s abridgement of “civil liberty” (a concept the New York Times
had recently dismissed as an “obstacle to progress”379). In fact, the ABA celebrated the
unique role of the judiciary in maintaining “constitutional safeguards to individual rights
of property and liberty” and, by extension, forestalling socialist revolution.380 And yet,
the Illinois State Bar Association captured lawyers’ dominant view when it passed a
resolution deeming it “contrary to the ethics of the profession for members of the Bar to
accept professional employment which will involve their appearance before the
exemption boards . . . for the purpose of securing for individuals or classes, exemption
from the selective draft for service during the war.”381 Conservatives were not yet
concerned with preserving personal rights, and they were unwilling to insulate antiwar
advocacy, let alone exemption from conscription for political objectors.382 It would take
much longer, and stronger threats to conservative interests, for the ACLU to accomplish
that goal.383
In elevating individual conscience over democratic consensus, the draft act
challenges threatened Progressive ideals; in serving socialist dissenters, they alienated
judicial enthusiasts. In short, the defense of political and absolutist objectors had few
advocates during the war. The NCLB’s participation in the conscription cases impeded
the organization’s fundraising and recruitment efforts. Correspondents complained that
“fighting the draft and attempting to repeal it merely discredits an organization which
indulges in the pastime without doing the slightest good.”384 Even allies who shared the
NCLB’s concern for conscientious objectors hesitated to impugn the constitutionality of
the draft.385 No less a civil libertarian than Zechariah Chafee accepted the legitimacy of
conscription and chalked up the constitutional challenge to “extreme views.”386
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By the spring of 1918, exemptions for inductees were the least of the NCLB’s
concerns. The organization was resisting government repression on multiple fronts,
including the federal prosecution of the entire leadership of the Industrial Workers of the
World.387 As sympathetic officials proved willing to accommodate individual objectors
with religious convictions, the NCLB’s particular allegiance to political objectors became
increasingly evident.388 Perhaps if the NCLB had remained within the AUAM and
maintained a more moderate posture, it might have extracted more concessions from
administration officials. Perhaps the government’s lackluster attitude drove the NCLB to
more radical methods. Either way, the NCLB’s efforts yielded fewer and fewer practical
results.
Early in 1918, official dealings with the NCLB became a liability for the War
Department.389 Colonel R. H. Van Deman, chief of the Intelligence Section of the War
College in Washington, D.C., had launched an investigation of Baldwin in December
1917.390 By the spring of 1918, the NCLB was under close observation.391 Keppel told
Baldwin in late February that many of Newton Baker’s “military associates” believed that
the NCLB was flirting with “direct conflict with the government.”392 In response,
Baldwin wrote to Major Nicholas Biddle, an intelligence officer, and—attaching all of
the organization’s printed materials, as well as its mailing list—requested that an inquiry
3, vol. 25 (“I have no doubt that I agree with your attitude as to the conscientious objector
and the question would, therefore, come on the draft. What I shall want to know sooner
or later is to what extent your Committee intends to push the question of the
constitutionality because I doubt the expediency of doing this and would not want to be
connected with it.”).
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be made into the NCLB’s activity to clear the organization’s name.393 Baldwin insisted
that the NCLB was not doing anything to embarrass the government’s recruitment effort,
and he wrote Van Deman directly with a promise to cease all potentially objectionable
activities.394 Van Deman nonetheless advised prosecution of Baldwin under the Sedition
Act, and although the NCLB’s activity was eventually deemed lawful, the War
Department severed communications with the group.395
Even then, the NCLB sought desperately to salvage the relationship. In
correspondence with Keppel, Baldwin emphasized that the NCLB was “acting wholly
within the letter of the law and within the spirit of the Secretary’s policy.”396 He
professed the organization’s willingness “to discontinue any practices” that the War
Department deemed objectionable.397 Shut out of the inner circles of the War
Department, Baldwin grew increasingly frustrated. To the last, he assured the War
Department that he stood ready “now, as at any time, to discontinue efforts which the
Secretary of War may not think to be helpful”—lest the breakdown in communication
“throw the whole matter into the field of public controversy and . . . undo much of the
quiet and effective work toward a satisfactory solution.”398 And yet, he grew “thoroughly
disgusted with the folks at Washington who have given us such hearty assurances.”399
Those assurances, he complained, did not translate into tolerant policy, and “the
indictments go on merrily.”400
Ultimately, the space between the NCLB’s position and the War Department’s
with respect to conscientious objectors was insurmountable. The Wilson administration
proved willing to do much to accommodate objectors who were unequivocally opposed
to participation in war and who were willing to accept alternative service, even if they
393
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were motivated by moral rather than religious scruples. But the Bureau’s special concern
for political objectors, who were willing to “take part in some wars, as for example social
revolutions,” bears emphasis.401 From the beginning, the NCLB leadership was
particularly concerned with those few stalwart radicals whose class-consciousness
motivated their resistance to a capitalist war, and who were therefore adjudged
insincere.402
This was a step that the Wilson administration was patently unwilling to make. As
Harlan Fiske Stone observed, reflecting after the war on his service for the Board of
Inquiry, it was “conceivable that one might have a moral and conscientious aversion to
participating in the late war with Germany, although such conscientious objection would
not prevent his participating in a war to exterminate the capitalist and the bourgeois.”403
But the Board was spared the task of assessing such “casuistic arguments.”404 It was the
War Department’s policy that conscientious objectors be accommodated only if they
opposed “all war on principle.”405 In correspondence with the NCLB, Newton Baker
explained that the appropriate place for political objectors was the “Disciplinary
Barracks.”406 Baker distinguished sharply “between the man whose fundamental
difficulty is the taking of human life, and the man who stands merely in political
opposition to the program which our government is now carrying out.”407
In the run-up to November’s Armistice, the NLCB leadership conveyed its
frustration in forthright terms. The NCLB faulted the government for its stubborn
insensitivity to the plight of absolutist objectors, who refused alternative service, and
especially to those “political objectors” who were willing to “take part in some wars, as
for example social revolutions.”408 Echoing Norman Angell, its representatives
emphasized in a September 1918 letter the “value of minorities in social process” (after
401
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all, the “minority of today may be the majority of tomorrow”) and society’s “incalculable
debt to its heretics.”409 They also emphasized the horrors of war, which “right-thinking
men” would consider justifiable only in legitimate cases of “social necessity.”410 And
they stressed that conscientious objectors would remain a small minority of eligible men,
given the tremendous social pressure to serve.411 But above all, they celebrated
conscience as a purely individual decision “whether a particular course of action under
particular conditions is morally right or wrong.”412 That the War Department believed the
political objectors were mistaken was irrelevant; the important point was that they were
sincere. Emphasis on “the value of the individual” distinguished American democracy
from the “Prussian doctrine of the total subordination of the individual to the state.”413
Answering for the War Department, Keppel balked. The suggestion that political
objectors merited exemption, he explained, revealed a “profound misapprehension” of the
principle on which the administration’s policy toward conscientious objectors was
based414—namely, “respect for the scruples of those who cannot conscientiously take
human life.”415 In his letter, Keppel succinctly elucidated the War Department’s rationale
for excluding political objectors. “The very root and essence of the whole matter is
conscientious aversion to destroying human life,” he explained.416 “The man who is
willing to take human life if, in his judgment, the occasion is sufficiently compelling,
obviously does not come within the shadow of this principle.”417
From the War Department’s perspective, the NCLB’s attitude was more than
merely misguided. “To admit such an exemption as that for which you contend would be
to admit the right of every man to set himself up as judge of the wisdom of our
Government in engaging in the present war,” Keppel continued.418 “[I]t would be to
acknowledge that the Selective Service Law is binding upon the drafted man only so far
as he sees fit to object it.”419 Newton Baker had made the same point in explaining why
no exemption could be extended to men of “enemy extraction.”420 Excusing military
service on that basis would open the floodgates to a broad range of exemption claims,
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from tax evasion to respecting others’ right to life.421 Any such outcome stood in direct
contrast to Progressive ideals.
War Department officials had prescribed tolerance for conscientious objectors
only because of the unmistakable moral gravity of inflicting death. “It has no broader
basis, and can have none, as long as organized government is to endure,” Keppel
added.422 The NCLB’s proposal amounted to “the negation of law, of authority, of
government when the individual is prepared to assert that these collide with his
conscience.”423 Following the path the NCLB advocated would undermine the “safety of
the United States.”424
As the end of the war approached, the NCLB’s erstwhile allies in the
administration worried that the NCLB itself, not just its clients, threatened state security.
The Post Office deemed fourteen of the organization’s pamphlets non-mailable, despite
doubting that they violated the Espionage Act (Judge Augustus Hand eventually held
them deliverable).425 In late August, government agents began investigating Baldwin’s
activities on behalf of the IWW.426 Nicholas Biddle, now a lieutenant colonel in the
Office of Military Intelligence, dispatched agents to the NCLB offices to gather evidence
for an Espionage Act prosecution.427 Walter Nelles linked the raid to patrioteering groups
and the IWW trial, as well as the organization’s work on behalf of conscientious
objectors.428 Despite demands for an indictment, the NCLB’s highly placed connections
(especially John Nevin Sayre, brother of President Wilson’s son-in-law), discouraged the
Department of Justice from prosecuting.429
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One member of the NCLB leadership, however, was soon to stand trial, albeit on
different charges. In August 1918, the draft age was raised from thirty to forty-five, and
the thirty-four-year-old Roger Baldwin became eligible for conscription.430 Baldwin
pledged to resign as director of the NCLB in order to take a “personal stand.”431 In midSeptember, he failed to appear for his physical examination and filed a statement refusing
to “perform any service under compulsion regardless of its character.”432 In October, he
was arrested upon his own request and (after various government officials earnestly tried
to change his mind) indicted for violation of the Selective Service Act.433
On October 30, 1918, Roger Baldwin appeared before Judge Julius Mayer in the
Southern District of New York434—the same judge who had presided over the July 1917
convictions of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman for conspiracy to interfere with
the draft.435 In his statement, Baldwin eschewed arguments about pluralism and the
public interest and instead emphasized his uncompromising commitment to “individual
freedom.”436 At the beginning of the war, Baldwin had tackled the problem of
conscientious objectors with the techniques and enthusiasm of a veteran Progressive
reformer. As the NCLB came under investigation and its clients languished in jail, he
grew disenchanted with state-centered reform. Indeed, he lost faith in the state
altogether.437
In his statement to the court, Baldwin declared himself unequivocally opposed to
war and, consequently, to conscription.438 But his refusal to perform military service was
part of a larger program. He informed the court that he would resist any attempt by
government to control his “choice of service and ideals.”439 He claimed an absolute right
of individual conscience—a right that superseded national allegiance and trumped
government power.440
Baldwin was explicit about his rejection of Progressive ideals. He recounted his
childhood and education, as well as his work in St. Louis as a social worker and
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reformer.441 He attributed his departure from St. Louis to his disillusionment with
incremental change.442 For the past six years, he had “felt [himself] heart and soul with
the world-wide radical movements for industrial and political freedom—wherever and
however expressed—and more and more impatient with reform.”443 Echoing the claims
of the radical libertarians and anarchists of the prior decade and, more prominently of
John Stuart Mill, he called for a “social order without any external restraints upon the
individual, save through public opinion and the opinion of friends and neighbors.”444
Although he was espousing a minority position, he believed himself to be part of a “great
revolt surging up from the people—the struggle of the masses against the rule of the
world.”445 And the movement he had joined was a fight against the “political state
itself.”446
To Judge Mayer, Baldwin’s beliefs were incompatible with the very republican
liberties he invoked.447 He advised Baldwin that “the freest discussion” should be
allowed and encouraged “in the processes that lead up to the enactment of a statute.”448
Once a law was passed, he added, the people were free to debate “the methods of [its]
administration.”449 But democracy was incompatible with individual disregard for duly
enacted laws.450 Although he was impressed with Baldwin’s sincerity, Judge Mayer
sentenced him to one year in prison, the maximum provided by law—an outcome that
Baldwin accepted with a “friendly smile.”451
Over the coming months, Baldwin’s friends and allies sought to secure him an
executive pardon, but Baldwin refused to leave jail except under a general amnesty.452 He
reiterated his opposition to state authority and affirmed his commitment to a “social
principle more precious . . . than personal freedom,” namely, the right to follow the
dictates of one’s God and conscience, which he linked to an “ancient principle of
individual liberty.”453 In Baldwin’s view, only a “clean-ought, straight-out recognition of
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the principle of individual conscience” would satisfy the demands of “sound public
policy.”454 To Baldwin, in contrast to his Progressive sometime allies, the state was “not
a sacred institution.”455 Baldwin rejected the romantic notion that state policy reflected a
“determined majority opinion.” Rather, the nation’s small cadre of elected officials
represented “the controlling economic interests of the country.”456 What Baldwin wanted
was a “new order of society, freed of the compulsion and arbitrary restraints of an all
supreme State.”457
Baldwin vowed not to leave prison through political favors while hundreds of his
fellow objectors continued to “drag out long, lifeless days behind bars.”458 In any case,
his own time in jail was tolerable, even “profitable.”459 As he told the New York Call, he
left prison “more of a radical than [he] went in.”460 He intended to decline participation in
any civic institution—including voting and jury duty—and to join the “revolutionary
labor movement,” since the world had “passed so-called political democracy” by.461 He
acted on his ideals by joining the IWW, the organization whose opposition to political
action influenced Baldwin’s own anti-statism most profoundly.462 He spent several
months traveling the country as an itinerant worker before returning to New York to
found the ACLU.463
IV. The Legacy of Conscience
The emergence of contemporary First Amendment doctrine in the wake of World
War I is an often told, if often oversimplified, story. In the conventional account, the
unprecedented scale of wartime suppression produced a new coalition of Progressives
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and liberal lawyers on behalf of expressive freedom.464 Rather than making the world
safe for democracy, the end of hostilities abroad unleashed a new wave of repression at
home.465 Unsettled by the scale of postwar intolerance, the new civil liberties movement
retooled free speech to protect the public interest and defuse social conflict.466 Judges and
academics allegedly rallied to a marketplace of ideas, where the best ideas would
eventually prevail.467 The same aversion to enforced conformity carried over to religious
freedom, albeit more slowly, and over the ensuing decades, the reach of the First
Amendment’s religion clauses expanded as well.468
This conventional story is partly true. Clearly, the war and the ensuing Red Scare
prompted reevaluation of the importance of the First Amendment.469 Organization and
advocacy on behalf of civil liberties were in shambles at the close of the war, but as the
wartime exigencies dissipated and repression continued, many Americans within and
outside the political and legal establishments began to espouse greater tolerance for
difference, and stronger adherence to the rule of law.470 In the history of civil liberties,
World War I is an undeniable flashpoint.
What the most familiar interwar figures demanded in the realm of personal rights
was, however, little more than a return to normalcy. The proponents of free speech during
and immediately after the war drew from tropes and tactics developed by Progressives
over the past two decades. Of course, they reassessed the priority of expressive freedom
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vis-à-vis other Progressive values; official lawlessness and vigilante violence, among
other concerning developments, had revealed the high cost of conformist propaganda.471
Many interwar civil liberties advocates responded to institutional developments,
including the dramatic expansion of administrative power.472 Above all, a few judges—
including some very important ones, like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis
Brandeis—came to recognize a role for the judiciary in insulating free speech from
democratic overreaching (though they remained dissenters throughout the 1920s).473
Nonetheless, the most prominent theories of civil liberties in 1920 borrowed heavily from
their prewar precursors.
The ACLU’s vision of civil liberties was an exception. If there was a single
salient feature of its founders’ wartime experience, it was the pervasiveness of failure. To
varying degrees, every office of government succumbed to patriotic fervor.474 More than
anything, the war shattered the confidence of the ACLU leadership in administrative
expertise and centralized state power, rendering the courts no worse (that is, equally
poor) a candidate for civil liberties enforcement than the tainted political branches. When
it was founded in 1920, the ACLU rejected all three as tools of civil liberties
enforcement, opting instead for the direct action tactics of the IWW and its other wartime
clients.475 That is, it folded both expressive and religious freedom into a new, stateskeptical civil liberties agenda, which sought to insulate the labor struggle—including
labor’s most powerful economic weapons, the boycott and strike—against government
intervention. “We realize that these standards of civil liberty cannot be attained as
abstract principles or as constitutional guarantees,” it explained in an early statement.476
“Economic or political power is necessary to assert and maintain all ‘rights.’ In the midst
of any conflict they are not granted by the side holding the economic . . . power.”477
World War I taught the ACLU that unpopular minorities could not rely on state
moderation even when their friends occupied positions of power. But the NCLB
leadership learned another important lesson, as well. It learned that claims for expressive
On the relationship between official lawlessness, vigilante violence, and civil
liberties, see generally CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7.
472 CAPOZZOLA, supra note 7, at 210. On interwar efforts to grapple with the
expansion of administrative power, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE:
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014); Daniel R. Ernst,
Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic
Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171 (2009).
473 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239
(1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919). On Justice Holmes's conversion, see HEALY, supra note 7;
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freedom (as well as procedural rights) were more acceptable to Progressives than claims
for exemption on the basis of conscience. Both had yielded, of course, to the exigencies
of war. But the two types of failure were different in kind. Judges and public officials
who were sympathetic to free speech rejected exemption claims not only as a function of
wartime interest balancing, but also as a fundamental threat to Progressive values.478
Simply put, claims for expressive freedom—even court-centered and constitutional
ones—were more palatable to Progressives than conscience-based carve-outs from
generally applicable laws.
The modern vision of civil liberties emerged slowly and haltingly, and the ACLU
that engineered it bore little resemblance to its wartime precursor or to its present-day
heir. Between the great coal and steel strikes of 1919 and the early New Deal, when labor
militancy was at a relative low, the organization engaged in its most influential work.
Working in comparatively uncontroversial fields (like academic freedom and sex
education) and through less threatening methods (including legal defenses based on
sufficiency of the evidence), it grafted a state-skeptical defense of labor’s right to
organize and strike onto a conservative model of judicial enforcement.479 That is, the
modern First Amendment was not Zechariah Chafee’s First Amendment alone. It drew
support both from judicial enthusiasts skeptical of radical speech and from Progressive
pluralists otherwise antagonistic toward the federal courts.480
In the domain of conscience, however, the old Progressive hostility toward
individual rights endured, and consensus proved harder to attain. During the 1920s,
conservatives decried the expanding reach of state power, a phenomenon it associated
with Prohibition almost as much as restrictive economic laws.481 Some explicitly
analogized to religious freedom. Shortly after the Volstead Act took effect, Columbia
President Nicholas Murray Butler cautioned that
[t]he use of the power of the state to enforce some particular rule of
conduct, which those to whom it appeals describe as moral, may easily
differ only in form and not in fact from the long since abandoned use of
the power of the state to enforce conformity in religious belief and
worship.482
Incensed by the intrusion, he cast “[p]rivate morals and private conduct” as “matters for
the conscience of the individual” rather than majoritarian regulation.483 A few years later,
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he lamented a “spineless corporate opinion which . . . aims to reduce all individuality,
whether of mind or character, to a gelatinous and wobbling mass.”484
Apprehensions of this type fueled conservative support for the ACLU’s early
forays into religious freedom. In its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme
Court invalidated a state law restricting foreign-language instruction in the schools.485 In
an opinion which presumed that substantive due process encompassed the right “to
worship God according to the dictates of one’s conscience,” the majority identified
education as a matter of “supreme importance” and deemed the law an unconstitutional
abridgement of “rights long freely enjoyed.”486 In a striking contrast to the Court’s free
speech cases, it was Justice Holmes who dissented—reluctant, as in cases involving
property rights—to substitute the Court’s judgment for the state of Nebraska’s.487
When Meyer was decided, the ACLU considered it an “unimportant” case.488
Still, the organization’s leadership appreciated its prospective importance as a litigation
tool. Indeed, the ACLU criticized the compulsory education statute at issue in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,489 an Oregon initiative measure partly justified by Progressive
confidence in equality through acculturation.490 William S. U’Ren, an eminent Oregon
Progressive, assured the executive committee that Oregon’s governor was a “liberal” and
that the law posed no threat to “civil or religious liberty;” on the contrary, it would raise
the quality of public education for all Oregon children.491 The ACLU was unconvinced.
Like the Court (this time, unanimous), it rejected the “power of the State to standardize
its children.”492 Although its principal motivation was class-consciousness rather than
cultural or religious pluralism, it cast the Oregon act as incompatible with “the right to
worship according to the dictates of one’s conscience.”493
In the mid-1920s, the ACLU became embroiled in the battle over evolution, most
famously in Dayton, Tennessee, where it defended John Thomas Scopes in a test case of
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the state’s prohibition on teaching evolution in state-funded schools.494 The ACLU raised
a litany of claims under the state and federal constitutions, including an argument that the
law established Christianity in general and Evangelism in particular.495 As the state
framed it, however, the central issue in the trial was whether a popular majority could
dictate the curriculum in the public schools. The law’s defenders described that authority
as “fundamentally legislative” and insisted the courts could not cabin it.496 To the
ACLU, by contrast, the police power did not extend to standardizing thought. The antievolution laws were of a piece with compulsory bible reading and with attacks on radical
teachers. “All of them,” it insisted, “involve precisely the same issues as the laws
punishing opinion passed during the war,” and with the anti-syndicalism laws that
followed it. That is, all of them reflected a growing attempt “to regulate public opinion
and to penalize minority and heretical views”—which, in the ACLU’s opinion, justified
invalidation on constitutional grounds.497
The ACLU’s position found adherents among respected public officials. The
former Progressive governor and future Supreme Court justice Charles Evans Hughes
conveyed a similar sense of the limits of legislative authority in a 1925 address as
president of the American Bar Association.498 Hughes regarded regulation as necessary to
social progress and trusted the state to protect its citizens from disease, unhealthy
economic practices (equivocally defined), and careless drivers.499 At the same time, he
endorsed the freedom “to worship God according to the dictates of [one’s] own
conscience,”500 and he proclaimed “the immunity of the domain of conscience” from
government control.501 The Tennessee evolution law crossed the line because it
constrained “the pursuit of knowledge … [by] aiming at the protection of creed or
dogma.”502 Like the ACLU, Hughes framed cases like Meyer, Pierce, and Scopes in
relation to “freedom of learning” as the “vital breath of democracy and progress.”503 It is
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no wonder that the organization had hoped to have Hughes, rather than Clarence Darrow,
argue the Scopes case on appeal.504
In short, as the ACLU built its civil liberties coalition, it occasionally invoked
individual conscience and religious freedom as motivating principles. The laws it
challenged, however, involved deliberate efforts by majorities to enforce uniformity of
thought, not neutral regulations that burdened idiosyncratic beliefs.505 That distinction
mattered to commentators. One article in the American Bar Association Journal
impugned the constitutionality of the Tennessee anti-evolution law on Establishment
Clause grounds. Indeed, it went so far as to imply a right for an instructor “who
conscientiously believes in evolution” to teach “what he believes to be true.”506 But the
limits of the article’s analysis are as telling as its surprising sweep. The author took for
granted that the liberty of conscience protected by the Constitution did not “give a right
to a Jew to refuse to testify in court on Saturday, or the right to work on Sunday, or to a
Quaker the right to stay home from the war, or to a teacher the right to teach Pacifism in
the schools.”507 After all, he reasoned, “The state must protect itself, administer justice,
and conserve the public health.”508 The Tennessee law was suspect only because its
purpose was to preserve religion rather than “public safety.”509 Americans could not
insulate their ordinary conduct from government regulation by investing it with religious
meaning, let alone by invoking moral or political opposition to its goals.
Moreover, for many potential ACLU supporters, even the most egregious
orthodoxies were insufficient to warrant judicial intervention, as opposed to legislative
toleration or administrative moderation. Among the skeptics—despite its sympathy for
academic freedom and its distaste for the Tennessee evolution law—was that old
Progressive outlet the New Republic. “Why should the Civil Liberties Union have
consented to charge the State of Tennessee with disobeying the Constitution in order
legally to exonerate Mr. Scopes?” one article poignantly asked. “They should have
participated in the case, if at all, for the purpose of fastening the responsibility for
vindicating Mr. Scopes, not on the Supreme Court of the United States, but on the
legislature and people of Tennessee.”510
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The implausibility of a broader program for judicial accommodation of
conscience was evident in the ACLU’s interwar challenges to a series of decisions
refusing citizenship to alien pacifists. In 1929, the Supreme Court handed down a
decision denying citizenship to Rosika Schwimmer, a fifty-year-old atheist, on the basis
of her stated refusal to bear arms. According to the ACLU, which paid Schimmer’s legal
expenses,511 no Supreme Court case since the war had “violate[d] the old traditions more
squarely” than Schwimmer v. United States.”512 Although Schwimmer’s lawyer
emphasized statutory interpretation and the Court did not contemplate a Free Exercise
claim, the ACLU clearly understood the case as an heir to its wartime attack on the draft.
The United States was “founded on principles of religious freedom and liberty of
conscience,” an ACLU pamphlet insisted.513 In fact, the government’s generous
accommodation of conscientious objectors during World War I had recognized as
much.514
To the Court, by contrast, the wartime experience cut the opposite way. In
refusing to comply with the laws of the United States, pacifists and conscientious
objectors had evinced a “lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution,” which
the Naturalization Act required as a condition of citizenship. Schwimmer was an
outspoken pacifist, and Justice Butler noted for the majority that she was “disposed to
exert her power to influence others.”515 It was that aspect of that case that most troubled
Justice Holmes, who (along with Justices Brandeis and Sanford) dissented.516 Some of
Schwimmer’s beliefs “might excite popular prejudice,” he acknowledged, “but, if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other, it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us, but
freedom for the thought that we hate.”517
The ACLU regarded the Schwimmer decision as a call to action.518 In Congress, it
unsuccessfully pursued legislation to admit pacifists to citizenship.519 Meanwhile, it
sought test cases involving “members of religious sects historically opposed to war, and
individual religious objectors,” in order to raise squarely the religious freedom question
that was muted in Schwimmer.520 Two years later, two cases made their way to the
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Supreme Court, both involving would-be citizens whose qualms about bearing arms were
religious in nature.521 This time, the briefs expressly argued that “the constitutional
protection of religious freedom does embrace conscientious scruples against bearing arms
in a war.”522 In United States v. Macinstosh and United States v. Bland, five-justice
majorities upheld the denial of citizenship. The close margins mask significant agreement
on the limits of conscience-based exemptions.
Writing for the majority in Macintosh, Justice Sutherland cast Americans as a
“Christian people” even while he insisted that “submission and obedience to the laws of
the land” were consistent with the “will of God.”523 Sutherland rejected as “astonishing”
the notion of a constitutional right not to bear arms.524 “Of course, there is no such
principle of the Constitution,” he wrote. “The conscientious objector is relieved from the
obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied,
but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve
him.”525
Indeed, for the dissent as well as the majority, the relevant question was whether
Congress had been as forbearing in its naturalization laws as it was in imposing
conscription. Justice Hughes wrote the dissenting opinion, which bore traces of his 1925
statement to the ABA. He began by clarifying the narrowness of the issue before the
Court. The case did not involve the power of Congress to compel military service, nor to
specify conditions for naturalization, even onerous ones. The question, rather, was
whether Congress had in fact elected to condition naturalization on a promise to bear
arms.526 And it mattered to Hughes that no statute had expressly done so.527 Hughes
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283
U.S. 636 (1931).
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Second Circuit (reversing the District Court) had held that Marie Averil Bland was
entitled to be admitted to citizenship. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v.
Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931), at 7. Bland, also Canadian, had indicated that she would
refuse to bear arms under any circumstances. Id. at 1.
523 Id. at 625.
524 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931).
525 Id.
526 Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 627 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
527 The Naturalization Act, § 3–4, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (U.S.C. Title 8, § 372 et seq.),
specified the conditions for admission to citizenship and conferred jurisdiction to
naturalize aliens on the district courts of the United States. Section 4 required the
521

68

declined to infer intent to exclude conscientious objectors from the general words of the
Naturalization Act because he believed such a construction was “directly opposed to the
spirit of our institutions and to the historic practice of the Congress.”528 The Court’s
decision amounted to a usurpation by “judicial decision” of a “legislative function.”529
To be sure, what troubled Hughes was more than specious statutory interpretation,
and he acknowledged that the scope of freedom of conscience was a function of
constitutional law was well as legislative policy.530 The naturalization cases turned on an
applicant’s willingness to swear an oath, which necessarily implicated the dictates of
conscience531—and “in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the
state ha[d] always been maintained.”532 To extract an oath conflicting with religious
scruples was a grave undertaking. Congress had wisely interpreted the oath of office in a
manner that accommodated conscientious objectors to war, and there was every reason to
extend that tolerant spirit to the requirements for naturalization.533 At the same time,
“within the domain of power,” government was free to “enforce obedience to laws
regardless of scruples.”534 In short, Hughes’s dissent was hardly an endorsement of
exemptions from neutral laws.
In an amicus brief in Macintosh,535 the American Friends Service Committee
echoed Norman Thomas’s wartime efforts to extend the Progressive theory of free speech
to religious freedom.536 The notion that the United States, “demands unqualified
subjection, so that the ‘majority’ of the ‘people’ shall rule in all spheres and on all issues”
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particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of which he was
before a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the Constitution and laws
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith
and allegiance to the same."
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was tantamount to the “Prussian philosophy of the State,” it argued.537 The more “liberal”
approach promoted by conscientious objectors would enhance the legitimacy of the state,
not undermine its power.538 Hughes was deeply sympathetic to this Progressive defense
of First Amendment freedoms. Within weeks of the Court’s decision in United States v.
Macintosh, he authored majority opinions in two iconic First Amendment cases
upholding expressive freedom.539 He nonetheless maintained that “[w]hen one’s belief
collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere, and
submission or punishment follows.”540
Over the course of the 1920s, the limitations of the ACLU’s assault on state
authority became increasingly evident. In 1929, the executive committee asked the
national committee to approve an expansion of the organization’s activity.541 Since its
founding, it recounted in a letter, the ACLU had defended freedom of speech, press, and
assembly, and it had “used the phrase ‘civil liberties’ as expressive of those three
rights.”542 Conspicuously missing from the description of the organization’s program was
any mention of freedom of conscience, which had figured so prominently in the wartime
agenda of the NCLB.543
In its letter to the national committee, the ACLU’s leadership proposed several
areas of increased activity, including assistance to racial minorities, immigrants, criminal
defendants, and religious minorities.544 Among the controversial suggestions was one of
special significance: “Aid in the campaign against compulsory military training.”545 One
of its most forceful opponents was Karl Llewellyn, who thought it unduly entangled the
ACLU in radical causes and interfered with “a matter rather of policy in governmental
organization than of liberties of the citizen.”546 Felix Frankfurter, too, initially resisted the
Brief, supra note 535, at 8. Cf. Thomas, supra note 73, at 393 (“It is the essence of
democracy to believe that the state exists for the wellbeing of individuals; it is the
essence of Prussianism to believe that individuals exist for the service of some
unreal metaphysical entity called the state.”).
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proposal, though he eventually backed down.547 In a statement that reveals the interwar
reconfiguration of the organization’s ambitions, Frankfurter told Baldwin that he was
emphatically against assuming responsibility for the protection of negroes,
the promotion of pacific ideals, the resistance of economic penetration in
Latin-America, etc., etc., etc., except in so far as activities or opinions in
regard to the foregoing or any other item, like birth control, raise
questions of freedom of speech, press and assembly.548
In other words, a civil liberties organization properly pursued full and open discussion of
appropriate state policy, not particular policy ends, let alone exemptions from those
policies once they were enacted.
In response to a flood of criticism of this sort, the executive committee resolved
not to take on “opposition to compulsory military training as a violation of liberty of
conscience, instead of as now, opposition only to interference with agitation against
it.”549 In 1934, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge to a California law
requiring University of California students to participate in military training.550 John
Beardsley, longtime chairman of the ACLU’s Southern California Branch, argued the
case in the Supreme Court.551 According to the national office, the Court’s decision
“end[ed] the campaign to secure legal exemption for conscientious objectors where either
law or college regulations require it.”552 When Congress enacted a peacetime draft in
1940, the ACLU declined to oppose it, though it did advocate broad statutory exemptions
for conscientious objectors.553 Two years later the organization took the unlikely step of
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backing the administration’s proposal to conscript all adults into compulsory civilian
service.554
A final ACLU enterprise of the interwar period clarifies the organization’s
underlying concerns. Beginning in the mid-1920s, the ACLU actively defended
Jehovah’s Witnesses in their refusal to salute the American flag.555 Like oaths of
allegiance, the flag salute implicated ideological orthodoxy, not the economy or public
health. Although the ACLU described the flag salute cases in terms of “religious liberty,”
the organization pursued them out of concern for “freedom in the schools” (the same
interest that informed its positions in Meyer, Pierce, and Scopes) as much as, if not more
than, “freedom of conscience.”556 Even in that limited domain, the courts that considered
the issue prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis557 typically rejected the notion that a religious conviction could “interfere with
the state’s enactments for its safety, preservation or welfare.”558
As for advocates and scholars, many believed the children’s scruples should be
balanced against state interests, and the flag salute cases squarely raised the question
whether courts or legislatures should do the balancing.559 Despite his sympathy for liberty
of conscience as a policy matter, Felix Frankfurter famously allocated that responsibility
to the political branches as a newly appointed justice of the Supreme Court.560
broad exemptions
Id. at 152. The ACLU’s support for the administration on these issues must,
however, be read in the context of its strong anti-fascism, as well as their strong
political ties to Roosevelt. Id. at 139.
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AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 15–55 (2010); Leah Weinryb-Grohsgal,
Reinventing Civil Liberties: Religious Groups, Organized Litigation, and the Rights
Revolution (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University); Nussbaum, supra note 21, at
199–214.
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AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, HOW GOES THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE STORY OF THE FIGHT
FOR CIVIL LIBERTY, 1935–1936 39 (1936); AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, ETERNAL
VIGILANCE! THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY, 1937–1938 61 (1938). In fact, the 1939
Annual Report listed flag salute cases under “Freedom in Schools and Colleges” rather
than “Religious Freedom.” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 150 YEARS
AFTER: THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY 1938–1939 34, 46 (1939).
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Rauner Special Collection Library, Hanover, NH [hereinafter Clark Papers], box 86,
folder 4.
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By the late 1930s, the ACLU had helped to engineer a new understanding of the
First Amendment speech clauses—one that insulated some conduct (including, for a time,
labor picketing and strikes) as well as more conventional expression.561 The new vision
bore a strong connection to the property rights and contractual freedom the AUAM’s
leadership had so strongly decried. Businesses employed the revised First Amendment to
dismantle New Deal regulatory constraints, sometimes with the ACLU’s approval.562 In a
1936 article, John Dewey—by then, a member of the ACLU—described the competing
justifications that were often intermingled in a theoretical morass of civil liberties
claims.563 On one account, civil liberties were valued for their “contribution to the
welfare of the community.”564 The “dominant philosophy,” by contrast, had “sprung from
fear of government and of organized control.”565 Under that model, freedom of
conscience was a natural right, prior to and independent of the state.566
And yet, liberals and conservatives alike stopped short of the NCLB’s wartime
appeals to conscience as a license for exemption from ordinary laws. At the ACLU’s
urging, the newly formed Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar
Association filed an amicus brief in the Gobitis case.567 After much agonizing, the
committee opposed the law as an unconstitutional measure, as committee chair Grenville
Clark put it, “to induce loyalty by coercion.”568 At the same time, there was a general
unwillingness on the committee to “permit every crack-pot to exercise untrammeled his
definition of freedom of conscience,” lest liberty degenerate into “anarchy.”569 In Clark’s
formulation:
Neither an assertion of religious scruples nor a general claim of
‘individual liberty’ should avail to nullify a statute requiring vaccination
561

I develop this argument in Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties,
Labor, and the Limits of State Power, 1917–1940 (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University); Weinrib, supra note 31, chapters 6–8.
562 For example, after agonized debate, the ACLU defended the asserted First
Amendment right of employers to distribute anti-union literature to their
employees. See Nat’l Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.
1940); Weinrib, supra note 31, at chapter 8.
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Id.
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Id.
566
Dewey favored the former, and he considered it inevitable in modern society that
“merely individual claims [would] be forced to give way in practice to social claims.” Id.
567 Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Letter from Grenville Clark to George I. Haight (Mar. 25, 1940), Clark Papers, box
79, folder 32.
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(this is a matter of public health) or perhaps, in the future, the
fingerprinting of children or the whole population, if it becomes
reasonably apparent that this would materially aid the reduction of crime
(this involves internal safety and order); or again to nullify laws
prohibiting acts against the prevailing public morals, such as free love or
plural marriages (this involves the public morals); or again to nullify laws
for national service in case of war or domestic emergency, such as
conscription or universal military training (these may well become
essential to the national existence as they may already be necessary in
England).570
For the time being, the domain in which conscience operated to authorize exemptions
was vanishingly small. Indeed, it was practically coextensive with the right of free
speech—a development that explains why so many formative religious freedom cases
involved religious proselytizing and literature distribution, beginning with the first case
incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth.571
As war again occupied the national stage, even critics of the Court’s decision in
Gobitis did not mean “to suggest that conscientious scruples can stand against all
compulsion to do positive acts”; where the “public need for coerced and insincere
saluting of the flag by little children” appeared to be trivial, Thomas Reed Powell
pointedly explained, the “public need for armed defense may well be regarded as the
most pressing public need of all.”572 That the contemporaneous law-review literature
overwhelmingly regarded Gobitis as wrongly decided reflects the nature of compulsory
flag salutes as unabashed attempts to enforce conformity. It is no accident that the
Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. Barnette (overruling Gobitis) relied on a
theory of compelled speech—forbidding the state from prescribing “what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, or other matter of opinion”—as opposed to freedom of
conscience.573 Even Harlan Fisk Stone, twenty-five years after serving on the War
Department’s Board of Inquiry during World War I, believed that in an “organized
society, the majority must rule, and that consequently I must obey some laws of which I
do not approve.”574 No wonder, then, that he based his lonely dissent in Gobitis on the
“freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall
say,” not what he shall do.575
570
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Conclusion
By the 1940s, liberty of conscience was firmly ensconced as a constitutional
value—indeed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered it part of “our national
birthright”576—but its reach was modest and its meaning far less controversial than the
capacious shield against state power the NCLB had once endorsed. Liberty did not
encompass an individual right to forswear state compulsion. As Attorney General Frank
Murphy explained, it meant “that little group of Mennonites or Mormons or Quakers
worshipping in their own churches in the way that their consciences tell them is right.”577
Even Norman Thomas reframed his longstanding commitment to “freedom of
conscience” as a right to “argue freely according to conscience.”578
In the universe of possible claims for exemption from neutrally applicable laws, it
is difficult to imagine one less palatable than the NCLB’s. At the height of national fervor
for the First World War, the fledgling organization asserted a right to avoid compulsory
military service on the basis of political opposition to a particular war—a war declared by
Congress, endorsed by popular majorities, and justified as serving democratic ends. What
is most surprising about the NLCB’s exertions on behalf of conscientious objectors is that
they attained any traction at all.
Perhaps if civil liberties advocates had begun with claims to free speech and
gradually worked toward freedom of conscience, their justification for exemptions might
have taken root. Similarly, one might imagine that a more modest claim (in an area lest
tied to military necessity, or on behalf of more sympathetic claimants) could have
succeeded where the NCLB’s ambitious program failed. The audacity of the NCLB’s
approach is neatly captured in Judge Julius Mayer’s statement upon sentencing Roger
Baldwin for failure to yield to the draft. “I cannot emphasize too strongly that in my view
. . . this war [could] not have been successful and in a self-respecting way carried on by
the United States Government if such an attitude as yours had prevailed,” he told
Baldwin, in a nod to the vital government interests at stake.579
Half a century elapsed—and massive social and cultural transformations
reshaped American attitudes toward war, civil liberties, and the state—before arguments
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of the kind the NCLB espoused persuaded a majority of the Court. In United Sates v.
Seeger and Welsh v. United States, as Americans again were drafted into military service
and deployed overseas, the Supreme Court expanded the grounds for conscientious
objection to encompass ethical and moral beliefs, albeit as a matter of statutory
interpretation rather than constitutional law.580 The ACLU was unabashedly activist in its
opposition to Vietnam,581 and it is no wonder that Roger Baldwin celebrated the Court’s
concession to conscience.582
For a time, the Court was also receptive to claims for exemption on First
Amendment grounds. Its 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner extended to the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment the same “compelling state interest”
requirement it had fashioned for free speech.583 Nine years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
the Court offered its most expansive reading of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment.584 Even in Yoder, it declined to extend the constitutional protection of
freedom of conscience to political or moral claims; it cautiously clarified that “[a] way of
life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed a barrier to reasonable state
regulation . . . if it is based on purely secular considerations.”585 Still, the Court declared
580
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that “[o]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”586
Despite Yoder’s lofty language, constitutional claims for exemptions rarely
succeeded in practice.587 The few successful cases generally involved denial of
unemployment benefits under circumstances very similar to Sherbert.588 Yoder itself—as
in Meyer, Pierce, and Scopes half a century earlier—involved a state’s effort to control
childhood education, a domain in which the dangers of enforced conformity and the
erasure of competing cultural values appeared particularly acute. And in 1990, the Court
officially abandoned the so-called Sherbert-Yoder test,589 In his majority opinion in
Employment Division v. Smith,590 Justice Scalia explicitly repudiated the analogy with
expressive freedom that had purportedly justified the Court’s exacting scrutiny. The two
contexts, he explained, were “not remotely comparable.”591 On the contrary, to recognize
“a private right to ignore generally applicable laws” would create a “constitutional
anomaly.”592

U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(j)(3)(B), 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (2006) (providing exemption for
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Whatever its doctrinal status, however, freedom of conscience was firmly
ensconced in American constitutional culture by the time Smith was decided. Advocates,
politicians, and many academics decried the Court’s decision.593 Congress responded
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,594 a legislative effort “to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner …and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”595
Congressional support for RFRA was practically unanimous, and Bill Clinton—
“voic[ing] wonder” at the unusual “alliance of forces that are often at odds across
religious or ideological lines”— enthusiastically signed the law.596 Among the bill’s
staunchest supporters was the ACLU, whose president, testifying before Congress,
criticized the Court for “departing so dramatically from traditional constitutional
principles”597 and celebrated RFRA for “restor[ing] religious liberty to its rightful place
as a preferred value and a fundamental right within the American constitutional
system.”598
The ACLU’s euphoric moment was, however, short-lived. At the end of the
twentieth century, the changing nature of demands for exemptions under RFRA and its
state counterparts began to trouble the organization.599 An escalation in the rhetoric of
religious freedom and liberty of conscience corresponded with a proliferation of claims
related to same sex marriage and reproductive rights.600 RFRA, the ACLU complained,
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was “used as a sword to discriminate against women, gay and transgender people and
others.”601
In recent years, individuals and organizations hostile to the contraception mandate
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have demanded sweeping exemptions
on the basis of religious beliefs602 and, in some cases, “moral” opposition as well.603
Vendors have asserted religious objections to state and local anti-discrimination laws,604
and a county clerk famously defied a federal court order requiring her to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples following the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges.605 The ACLU has criticized the newest set of challenges to the ACA’s
contraception mandate for endeavoring to deprive women “of a benefit guaranteed by
law.”606 Although proponents of exemptions link their campaign to a “long and rich
tradition of religious freedom,”607 critics have hastened to emphasize the distance
between current claims and their historical antecedents.608
Melling, supra note 599.
E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). This term, the Supreme
Court will decide a set of cases involving religious non-profits claiming exemption
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In his introduction to a bound volume of the ACLU’s annual reports released in
1970, the same year that Welsh v. United States was decided, Roger Baldwin celebrated
the disruptive capacity of conscientious objection. “In the name of liberty, we support
disobedience to laws we think unconstitutional or contrary to our principles, he wrote.609
“The history of civil liberties is marked by the acts of courageous men and women who
put moral claims of conscience ahead of obedience to law, and who by their acts, often at
the price of their freedom, helped win legal recognition of their claims.”610 Baldwin’s
certitude echoes today in a generalized First Amendment attack on the regulatory state.611
In an irony that would have bemused the labor advocates of the NCLB, the Supreme
Court this term will consider a constitutional challenge to public sector agency fee
arrangements, which require non-members of a union to contribute to the costs of
collective bargaining and thereby—according to the California public school teacher for
whom the case is named—render them “troubled in their conscience.”612
The NCLB, of course, could not have anticipated the world of RFRA, the
Affordable Care Act, and Obergefell v. Hodges. It would not have worried, as the ACLU
does today, that exemptions from generally applicable laws might be made “to force
employees to pay a price for their employer’s faith.”613 After all, at the height of the
Lochner era, employers’ constitutional and common law property rights ensured that
employers could hire, fire, and allocate or deny benefits with almost perfect impunity.
Liberty of contract was constitutionally secure, and there was little reason to worry that
businesses would discriminate on the basis of religious freedom instead.
And yet, for those Progressives who had confronted the costs of countermajoritarian constitutionalism head on, there was ample reason to interrogate an
extension of individual rights. In 1905, as attorney general of New York, Julius M. Mayer
had unsuccessfully defended the maximum hours law at issue in Lochner v. New York
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(section on “The Lochnerization of the First Amendment”). On a similar trend in
religious freedom cases, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1453 (2015). Elsewhere, I argue that the roots of First Amendment
Lochnerism were laid in the late 1930s, as judicial review of personal liberties
emerged as an alternative to freedom of contract and property rights. Weinrib,
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before the Supreme Court.614 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that Judge Mayer proved
unreceptive to Baldwin’s uncompromising insistence on individual autonomy. To
Mayer, Baldwin’s refusal to submit to state power threatened the very basis of democratic
government. “I think such an attitude would have led inevitably to disorder and finally to
the destruction of a Government, which with all of the imperfections that may attach to
human government, has proved itself, as I view it, to be a real people’s Government,”
Judge Mayer reflected.615 The success of American democracy was “evidenced by the
millions upon millions of men who voluntarily obey the laws—and some of them
requiring great sacrifice—which, as enacted by the legislature, embody the judgment of
the people at large.”616
At the dawn of the modern First Amendment, concern for democratic openness
and pluralistic tolerance did not inevitably entail accommodation of individual belief.
Conscientious objectors found few defenders among even the staunchest supporters of
free speech. As the ACLU embarked on its interwar project of promoting labor’s rights, a
growing cadre of lawyers, scholars, public officials, and judges proved receptive to the
organization’s appeal to expressive freedom. Most nonetheless maintained, with Judge
Mayer, that to countenance exemption from democratic laws was to endanger democracy
itself.

Mayer’s cursory brief has prompted speculation that he considered Lochner to be
either an easy case or a relatively unimportant case (in contrast to the Franchise Tax
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